Exploring political intolerance in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans : the role of intergroup threat and negative intergroup emotion by Ojiambo, Melina
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
1 
 
 
 
EXPLORING POLITICAL INTOLERANCE IN A POST-APARTHEID 
GENERATION OF SOUTH AFRICANS: THE ROLE OF INTERGROUP THREAT 
AND NEGATIVE INTERGROUP EMOTION 
 
 
Melina Ojiambo (OJMMEL001) 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements f r the award of the degree 
of Master of Arts in Psychological Research  
 
 
Faculty of Humanities 
University of Cape Town 
2011 
 
COMPULSORY DECLARATION 
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my 
own work.  Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or 
works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced. 
 
Signature:     Date:      
 
 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
2 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Firstly I would like to thank God, who has supported, encouraged and sustained me through 
this whole thesis process. This is for you. 
 
Thank you to my parents, Fred and Grace Ojiambo and the rest of my family for their endless 
support and prayers. 
 
To my supervisors, for steering me in the right direction through this whole process, and 
making me write and re-write numerous drafts of my work. To Liberty for her invaluable 
input in the conceptualisation of this study.   
 
To Michelle and Warren, for their help with getting my head around statistical analysis.  
 
To my friends, for withstanding my “thesis mood swings” and disappearing acts in the name 
of academia. For walking with me through this process, thank you. 
 
To all the participants for their valuable input, this thesis would never have materialised 
without you, so thank you.   
 
 
    
 
  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
Background and aim: There are several variables that are associated with the development 
of political intolerance in society. This study uses the intergroup emotions theory as a 
framework to investigate whether intergroup threat (more specifically perceived racial threat) 
and negative intergroup emotions precipitate political intolerance in a well educated, post-
apartheid generation of South Africans. It also examines whether outgroup appraisals 
(perceptions of outgroup strength) and degree of ingroup identification have a role to play in 
this hypothesised relationship. This study extends Gibson and Gouws‟ (2003) work on threat 
and intolerance as well as Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz and Wyer‟s (1991) work on the 
influence of emotion on people‟s tolerance judgements. 
Method: Participants were randomly assigned to two experimental groups. The independent 
variable, racial threat, was manipulated such that one group experienced more threat 
(increased threat group) than the other group (reduced threat group). Following this, the 
effect of this manipulation on the rest of the study variables was examined using 
questionnaires that were completed by the participants. The increased threat group comprised 
68 participants and the reduced threat group, 55. All these were South African, psychology 
students from the University of Cape Town (UCT) and were of different racial groups. 
Before the main study commenced, pilot studies were used to select and develop 
experimental stimuli for the manipulation of racial threat as well as to develop and refine 
scales for the different study variables. The pilot sample comprised 164 students from UCT. 
Thus the entire study sample comprised 287 participants  
Results and conclusion: In line with the hypotheses of the study, t-tests revealed that the 
increased threat group expressed significantly more anger, t (121) = 4.98, p <.01, d=.91; fear,  
t (121) = 4.14, p < .01, d = .75; and political intolerance, t (121) = 1.74, p = .04, d= .32 than 
the reduced threat group. No significant differences were found regarding outgroup appraisal 
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and racial identification. Similarly, linear regression analyses indicated that perceived racial 
threat is positively related to political intolerance, R
2
 = .05, F (1, 121) = 6.83, p = .01 and that 
this relationship is mediated by negative intergroup emotion. Outgroup appraisal and racial 
identification did not significantly influence this relationship. These findings strongly suggest 
that perceived racial threat and negative intergroup emotions are potent triggers of political 
intolerance.  
Key words: intergroup threat; intergroup emotion theory; negative emotions; outgroup 
appraisal; ingroup identification; political intolerance.                         
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The world that we live in today is rife with intergroup intolerance and the current 
upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East is a testament to this fact. In December 2010, 
civilian protests broke out in Tunisia and quickly spread across the Arabic region to over ten 
nations including Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Iran, Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Bowen, 
2011; Cutler, 2011). The protestors in most of these countries have called for the incumbent 
authorities to step down from government in a bid for economic, social and political change. 
In most cases, the uprisings have been met with both violent and non-violent repression by 
the ruling regimes. In Libya for instance, Colonel Muamar Gadaffi‟s security forces opened 
fire on unarmed civilians, while in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, a number of people have been 
killed by government forces during the protests. Some of the less aggressive forms of 
repression reported are the banning of media houses and civilian protests. Artists and 
intellectuals who speak out against the authorities have also been targeted, harassed and 
arrested by government officials in some countries (Weaver, 2011). 
This conflict in the Middle East and North Africa and the repressive response of the 
authorities has again brought the vital issue of political intolerance to the fore. It is a stark 
reminder of the importance of fostering political tolerance in society for the sake of peace and 
stability. However, for this to be achieved, it is important to understand the mechanisms that 
lead to the breakdown of tolerance and the precipitation of intolerance. This is the main 
purpose of this thesis. 
 
INTERGROUP INTOLERANCE 
Political intolerance falls under the wider umbrella of intergroup intolerance which 
includes other forms like racial, ethnic and religious intolerance. Intergroup intolerance 
occurs when individuals from different social groups refuse to “bear with” each other due to 
the fact that the “other” belongs to a disliked group (Gibson, 1989). This dislike may be 
premised on different factors for example ethnicity, race, religion, nationality and differing 
ideologies (Gibson, 2006). The detested groups and their members are denied the opportunity 
to express themselves and their views in society and at the extreme end of intolerance, their 
right to exist as part of the society may also be challenged (Wenzel, Mummendy, & Waldzus, 
2007).   
Since time immemorial, intergroup intolerance has plagued various populations, 
frequently resulting in adverse conditions in communities. Ethnic intolerance for instance, 
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has been associated with the inhumane treatment and massacre of millions of people in a 
large number of contexts over the years. In Germany, it led to the ruthless killing of a vast 
number of Jewish people and the establishment of the appalling Nazi concentration camps 
during the Holocaust from early 1933 to mid 1945 (Petrie, 2000). In Rwanda, years of ethnic 
intolerance between the Hutu and Tutsi communities culminated in the 1994 genocide where 
approximately 800,000 people were killed in a period of 100 days (BBC, 2011; Mamdani, 
2001; McKenzie, 2008). Religious intolerance is another form that has pervaded a number of 
countries including Nigeria, Northern Ireland, India and Iraq just to name a few. In some 
cases, it has precipitated fatal conflict between different religious groups and resulted in the 
destruction of property, and the propagation of instability in society (Aliyu, 2009; Fox, 2004).  
It is clear from the discussion above that intergroup intolerance is not confined to 
particular regions or nations but is an issue that has permeated a vast number of countries in 
various developmental stages across the globe (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 
2009). More importantly, the examples above accentuate the fact that if intergroup 
intolerance remains unchecked, it can escalate into the unprecedented destruction of lives and 
property and the general breakdown of society. There is therefore an immense need for 
intergroup tolerance in our world today.   
This need has become even more urgent as societies have become increasingly 
heterogeneous. These days, it is not unusual to find people from different social, political, 
religious and ethnic groups living side by side in towns and cities. This co-existence in some 
cases may provide ample opportunity for dissent based on differences and competition 
between groups (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Thus, Stephan and colleagues are not 
far from the mark in claiming that “...in practice relations between groups are far more likely 
to be antagonistic than complementary” (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009, p.43). In light 
of all this, it is not surprising that intergroup intolerance has gained mounting prominence in 
the academic and research spheres. In the same vein, political intolerance has garnered much 
interest in the political, social and academic world. 
 
THE CONSTRUCT OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE 
Political tolerance purports that alternative voices in society should be given room for 
expression without fear of rebuttal or repression. In the words of Gibson (1989, p.19), 
“Political tolerance refers to the willingness of citizens to support the extension of rights of 
citizenship to all members of the polity  that is to allow political freedoms to those who are 
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politically different.” Thus, political intolerance is propagated when particular groups in 
society and/ or their members are denied basic political rights; for example, the right to 
express themselves publicly and the right to assemble. It is in direct opposition to diversity as 
it claims that individuals must be, think, or act in a specific way in order to be given 
expression (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Shamir, 1991). 
The construct of political intolerance encompasses both attitudes and behaviours 
ranging from non-confrontational to more confrontational forms of intolerance towards 
outgroups (Gibson, 2005).   Some examples of less confrontational forms are  not allowing 
particular books to be kept in libraries because of the views that they put forward, denying 
qualified individuals work opportunities because of their political affiliation, and not allowing 
particular individuals to speak at meetings because of their stance (Gibson & Bingham, 
1982). The more confrontational forms include (amongst many others) verbal and physical 
aggression towards the rival group, and the destruction of their property. 
Extensive research has been conducted around factors that influence the development 
of political intolerance. However, most of this research has been carried out in first world 
nations such as the U.S.A (e.g. Gibson, 1989; Gibson, 2008; and Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 
2004), and Russia (Gibson, 2002). Although some research has been conducted in developing 
countries such as South Africa (e.g. Gibson & Gouws, 2001 and Gibson & Gouws, 2003) it is 
not extensive. There is therefore still a need for more research in this particular context for a 
number of different reasons as will be seen below.    
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
South Africa is a nation whose history is riddled with high levels of political 
intolerance (Mare, 2000). During apartheid rule (1948-1994), the incumbent government 
made the division of the different racial groups the norm rather than the exception. They 
legalised the separation of races making this the official position of their reign (Gibson & 
Gouws, 2003; Gibson, 2006). As a result, some of the racial groups in South Africa were 
denied full political rights, for example the right to vote (Valji, 2004). Even after the demise 
of the apartheid regime, political intolerance continued to be part and parcel of South African 
society. In 1995 for example, the province of KwaZulu-Natal experienced high levels of 
violence between individuals of different political parties resulting in the death of over one 
hundred people per week. In addition, no go zones were demarcated for particular political 
parties (Gibson & Gouws, 2003).  
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More recently, political intolerance was witnessed during the period leading up to the 
2009 general elections. For instance, rallies were disrupted and posters of political candidates 
were destroyed by members of opposing parties. On a number of occasions, intolerance 
escalated into violent clashes between members of different parties sometimes resulting in 
death. Conflict was observed between various parties including the African National 
Congress (ANC), Congress of the People (COPE) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). 
Members of smaller political parties also claimed that they were victimised because of their 
political affiliation (Du Preez, 2009).  
Whilst South Africa is similar to a number of other contexts in terms of its widespread 
political intolerance, it is unique in a number of other respects. To begin with, as a lingering 
result of apartheid, divisions between different groups at present still run deep. It is true that 
segregation was officially abolished with the advent of majority rule and that over the years, 
various policies have been put in place to encourage integration. Nevertheless, informal 
segregation still persists to this day (Durrheim & Dixon, 2004). The threat and realism of 
one‟s political enemies may therefore be heightened in this polarised context (Gibson & 
Gouws, 2001).  
In addition, political groupings in South Africa are to a large extent associated with 
race, ethnicity and class (Mare, 2000). These di ferent social groups play a significant and 
influential role in the South African political sphere with race being one of the major key 
players. Apartheid rule meant that political parties were established within the framework of 
racial separatism. Hence parties were used as vehicles to push forward the agenda of the 
different racial groups and politics in South Africa became deeply racialised or based on 
one‟s ethnicity. Different political parties came to be associated with particular racial or 
ethnic groups (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). Although these political-racial divides are no longer 
as strong or as evident today, they are still present in society. Thus, “one cannot write about 
South African politics without writing about race” (Gibson & Gouws, 2003, p. 35). 
Correspondingly, it is not plausible to explore the issue of political intolerance in South 
Africa without exploring the issue of race (this study considers this in its design as will be 
seen later). 
It is apparent then, that the South African context is indeed distinctive and as is well 
known, the context of a study is very important. This is because it may influence the 
participants in different ways and thus influence the findings of the study. It is dangerous to 
assume that all individuals around the globe respond in the same ways to similar stimuli in 
different contexts. Therefore, though studies have previously been conducted around the 
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development of political intolerance in countries outside South Africa, it is important to 
investigate what the findings in this context will be (Gibson & Gouws, 2001).   
As mentioned earlier, some research around political intolerance and its antecedents 
has been conducted in South Africa. Most of these studies analysed data that was collected 
just before or soon after the abolishment of apartheid (1992- 2001) (e.g. Gibson & Gouws, 
2003 and Gibson, 2006). Thus, the participants were drawn from a generation of South 
Africans who grew up under apartheid rule. During this period, the political had a direct 
effect on the personal, as the lack of political power led to the social and economic 
marginalisation of particular ethnic groups. The impetus to be politically active and intolerant 
of rival parties was therefore probably much higher than it is at present (Gibson & Gouws, 
2003). Now, due to the advent of majority rule, there is a younger generation of South 
Africans who have grown up under very different political, social and economic 
circumstances. They have experienced a very different South Africa from the preceding 
generation. In light of this, it is pertinent to explore political intolerance in this younger 
generation of South Africans. In doing so, this thesis recognises the significant influence of 
the geographical context and specific time period (post-apartheid) on individuals.       
Some of the factors that have been put forward as possible precursors to political 
intolerance are perceived intergroup threat and negative affect (emotion) (Gibson & Gouws, 
2003; Shamir, 1991). Hence this study examines the role of perceived intergroup threat and 
negative intergroup emotion in the development of political intolerance within a new 
generation of South Africans. Due to the fact that race and politics in South Africa are highly 
intertwined (Mare, 2000), the kind of intergroup threat that will be employed in this 
investigation is perceived threat to one‟s racial group. Thus, this thesis aims to answer the 
question, “Is perceived racial threat associated with particular emotions that may trigger the 
development of political intolerance in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans?” The 
Intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) will be used as the theoretical 
framework for the exploration of this question and will be discussed in more detail in the 
second chapter of this thesis. 
 
ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is presented in six chapters. The current chapter introduced the construct 
of political intolerance, provided the context of the study, and outlined the general purpose 
and significance of the study.  
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Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the literature regarding intergroup threat, 
intergroup emotion and political intolerance. It will also present the theoretical underpinnings 
of this study in detail. The specific aims and hypotheses of the thesis will be presented at the 
end of this chapter. 
Chapter 3 will discuss a number of pilot studies that were used to develop and refine 
the materials (stimuli and scales) used in this study. It will therefore outline how the various 
materials were developed or selected. Chapter 4 will present the method of the main study 
including the design, sample, sampling strategy, procedure, materials, data analysis methods 
and ethical considerations.     
Chapter 5 will present the results of the study, and Chapter 6 will discuss the 
implications of these results, the limitations of the study, and recommendations for future 
research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
15 
 
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of empirical research around variables associated 
with political intolerance namely: intergroup threat, intergroup emotion, outgroup appraisal, 
and ingroup identification. The review begins by looking at the role of perceived intergroup 
threat in the preponderance of negative attitudes, action tendencies, and behaviour towards 
outgroups. Next, it presents the Intergroup emotions theory as the theoretical framework for 
this study, arguing that it provides a comprehensive explanation for how intergroup threat, 
intergroup emotion and the other aforementioned variables interact with each other in the 
development of political intolerance. This review therefore articulates the rationale 
underlying the hypotheses of the study which are presented at the end of the chapter. 
 
PERCEIVED INTERGROUP THREAT AND POLITICAL INTOLERANCE 
When individuals interact with each other in everyday life, they form social groups 
based on a diverse range of attributes such as gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, and 
religious affiliation. Individuals identify with and see themselves as part of particular groups, 
known as their ingroups. There are also other groups with which people do not identify. 
These “othered” groups are referred to as outgroups (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Gaertner et al., 
2000). If a particular group believes that one of their outgroups poses some kind of danger to 
them, intergroup threat may arise. Thus intergroup threat is experienced “when one group‟s 
actions, beliefs or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another 
group” (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006, p.336).  
There are various kinds of intergroup threat that have been put forward by theorists. 
The intergroup threat theory (formerly termed integrated threat theory) postulates that there 
are two dominant types, namely realistic and symbolic threat (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 
2009). Realistic threat encompasses anything that poses a challenge to the power of the 
ingroup, the amount of resources available to them as well as their physical well-being. If this 
challenge is posed towards the group‟s values, beliefs, morals and general way of life, it is 
known as symbolic threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). 
Some of the other kinds of intergroup threat proposed by various theorists are cultural 
(Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004), group esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994), and 
distinctiveness threat (Riek et al., 2006). Cultural threat is quite similar to symbolic threat in 
that it encompasses anything that challenges the general way of life (culture) of the ingroup 
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(Zarate et al., 2004). Group esteem threat on the other hand, refers to anything that threatens 
the worth or “self-esteem” of the group (Branscombe & Wann, 1994) while distinctiveness 
threat refers to anything that threatens the uniqueness of the ingroup (Riek et al., 2006).  
Although various studies document different kinds of intergroup threat, the effect of 
all these on attitudes towards outgroups is similar. Overall, perceived intergroup threat has 
been found to elicit negative attitudes towards outgroups. Riek and his colleagues (2006) 
conducted a meta-analysis on 95 samples investigating the relationship between intergroup 
threat and negative outgroup attitudes. Five different kinds of threat were examined and each 
of them was found to be significantly related to negative outgroup attitudes. 
Both correlational and experimental studies support the conclusion that perceived 
intergroup threat has a negative impact on intergroup relations. A correlational study 
conducted in Israel, found that realistic threat was a significant predictor of the prejudicial 
attitudes of native Israelis towards Russian immigrants (Bizman & Yinon, 2001).  
Cultural threat has also been associated with the adoption of negative attitudes 
towards outgroups. Zarate and colleagues (2004) found that when cultural intergroup 
differences were prominent, prejudicial attitudes towards outgroups were more prevalent. 
However, when groups perceived their outgroup to be culturally similar to them, prejudicial 
attitudes were less evident.   
Likewise, an experimental study investigating group esteem threat, found that it was 
related to outgroup derogation for individuals with high national identification. The 
participants in this study who were American were divided into two groups depending on 
their level of national identification. High identifiers were put in one group while low 
identifiers were put in another group. Each identification group was then split into two 
conditions: the no threat condition and the identity threatening condition (resulting in four 
separate groups). In the no threat condition, participants watched a six minute video clip of a 
boxing match in which a boxer of their nationality defeated a Russian boxer. In the identity 
threatening condition, participants also watched a short video clip of a boxing match, 
however at the end, the Russian boxer defeated the American one and this defeat was 
assumed to be a threat to their group esteem. The results of this experiment indicated that 
“the threat manipulation did not influence the amount of derogation observed among subjects 
who were low in identification with America”. However, “For those high in 
identification...the amount of Russian derogation was significantly higher in the threat 
condition than in the no threat condition” (Branscombe & Wann, 1994, p. 648).     
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Perceived intergroup threat is not only a significant predictor of negative attitudes but 
also impacts the action tendencies of ingroups towards outgroups. An action tendency can be 
defined as one‟s “readiness to engage or disengage from interaction with some goal object in 
some particular fashion” (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989, p. 213). Thus, action 
tendencies indicate how individuals are likely to behave in specific circumstances, and are 
frequently related to their actual behaviour (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009). An empirical 
study examining the relationship between perceived threat and attitudes towards affirmative 
action found that both realistic and symbolic threats were associated with opposition to 
affirmative action. The greater the perceived threat posed by this public policy to the ingroup, 
the greater the opposition was to the policy (Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006). 
Perceived threat in this case did not only influence the adoption of negative attitudes towards 
the outgroup but also influenced the way in which ingroup members were likely to behave 
(oppose or support affirmative action) that is their action tendencies.  
Perceived intergroup threat has also been associated with the actual behaviour of 
group members. A study investigating the responses that people have towards gay people 
found that symbolic threat influenced the behaviour of the participants towards these 
individuals. On average, participants (who were all heterosexual) were more likely to sit 
farther away from the gay individuals in the context of symbolic threat. However, in the non-
threatening situation, participants kept closer proximity to them (Bromgard & Stephan, 
2006).  
As aforementioned in the introductory chapter, political intolerance occurs when 
certain political groups and/or their members are denied the opportunity to express 
themselves and their views in society (Halperin et al., 2009). Political intolerance is therefore 
not merely a negative attitude that is held by individuals or groups of individuals, but also 
involves an action tendency, as it indicates how politically intolerant groups and their 
members are likely to behave towards disliked groups. Furthermore, it is often used to denote 
actual negative behaviour towards these outgroups. Political intolerance is therefore 
“multidimensional” (Gibson & Bingham, 1982, p. 604). Seeing that perceived intergroup 
threat has been found to be a good predictor of negative attitudes, action tendencies and 
behaviour, it is plausible that it may also be a predictor of the negative attitudes, action 
tendencies and behaviour comprised within political intolerance. Surprisingly, not many 
social psychologists have conducted research testing the link between perceived intergroup 
threat and political intolerance within the South African context where political intolerance is 
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so rampant. Relatively few studies investigating this relationship within this context were 
found (e.g. Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Gibson, 2006).    
One of the studies conducted in South Africa found that perceived threat to people‟s 
view of the “ideal” South African society (socio-tropic threat) was associated with political 
intolerance. The more participants felt that certain disliked groups threatened their “ideal 
society”, the more intolerant they were of these groups (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). An earlier 
study investigated the influence of the facts and information given to people (about civil 
liberties disputes) on their tolerance judgements.  The findings indicated that pre-existing 
threat perceptions of South Africans had more of an influence on their tolerance judgements 
than the facts or information presented in the actual dispute or situation (Gibson & Gouws, 
2001). Thus, these studies revealed that perceived intergroup threat was a significant 
predictor of political intolerance in the South African context at the time. Empirical research 
suggests that it does not work in isolation and that other significant factors, such as emotion, 
play an important role (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2003).  
 
INTERGROUP EMOTIONS THEORY 
The Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) is one of the theories that has dominated 
research concerning the role of emotion in triggering particular action tendencies and 
behaviour towards outgroups. It was used as the theoretical framework for this study to 
investigate the role of intergroup emotion in the development of political intolerance within 
the context of intergroup threat. This theory was selected because it offers a comprehensive 
explanation of how intergroup threat and emotion may interact in the development of 
political intolerance as will be seen below. IET is largely based on the self-categorisation 
theory (SCT) (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Turner, 1987) and appraisal theories of 
emotion (Fridja, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989). 
 
Self categorisation theory (SCT) 
Individuals situate themselves in various social groups in diverse contexts at different 
times, and this positioning gives them a social identity. When a particular social identity is 
made salient, people classify themselves into groups pertaining to this specific identity; that is 
self-categorisation (Miller, Smith, & Mackie, 2004; Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008). 
Thus, if nationality is made salient, people will categorise themselves according to the 
country they belong to. When individuals self-categorise, they begin to see themselves as 
similar to the other members of their ingroup. Moreover, the differences between them and 
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outgroup members become accentuated (Voci, 2006). Consequently, “self is viewed as an 
exemplar of the group rather than as a unique individual” (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 
2003, p.112). This process is known as depersonalisation (Devos et al., 2003).  
Emotion theorists have extended SCT to include emotions. Thus, they propose that 
depersonalisation leads the individuals within a group to converge towards their ingroup‟s 
emotions (Moons, Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2009). IET therefore contends that when a 
particular social identity is salient, the emotions that members of the ingroup experience will 
converge, leading to the propagation of socially shared emotion within the ingroup known as 
intergroup emotion (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2003). In addition, because 
social identity informs one‟s personal identity, what is important to the group will become 
important to the individual even if it does not personally affect them.  Hence, IET proposes 
that individuals may have an emotional reaction when something affects their ingroup even if 
they are not personally affected (Giner-Sorolla, Mackie, & Smith, 2007).   
Moons and colleagues (2009) carried out a study on American university students. 
The participants were asked to report the extent to which they felt certain emotions as 
individuals and as Americans. The participants were then given “fake” emotion stereotypes 
that described how Americans in general supposedly feel. After this, participants reported 
their emotions as individuals and as Americans again. When American social identity was 
made salient, the participants shifted their emotion towards what they believed their ingroup 
felt, that is toward the American emotion stereotypes. However, when thinking of themselves 
as individuals, there was no convergence of emotion even after they had been exposed to the 
stereotypes. A study conducted at Indiana University also found that when the participants‟ 
identity as students was made salient, the emotions that they expressed were similar. 
However, when they reported their emotions as individuals this convergence of emotion was 
no longer evident (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). 
Intergroup Emotions Theory goes a step further by proposing that the type of 
intergroup emotion experienced by the ingroup is largely dependent on appraisals of events, 
groups or entities that confront the ingroup, as will be seen below. 
 
Appraisal theories of emotion  
Appraisal theories of emotion address emotion at the individual level and maintain 
that when people are confronted by an event or entity, they cognitively evaluate and interpret 
it in terms of whether it will harm or benefit them (Frijda et al., 1989). These evaluations and 
interpretations trigger distinct emotional reactions, which are associated with specific action 
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tendencies and behaviours (Devos et al., 2003). IET applies appraisal theories of emotion to 
social groups. It claims that when social groups are challenged by outgroups, they appraise 
them in terms of whether they will benefit or harm the ingroup. These outgroup appraisals 
trigger specific emotional reactions (both within the ingroup and towards the outgroup) which 
are associated with specific action tendencies (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Some studies 
have found that when the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, the emotion that 
ingroup members are likely to experience is fear (Frijda et al., 1989; Halperin et al., 2009). 
However if the outgroup is appraised as weaker than the ingroup, the emotion that the 
ingroup members are likely to experience is anger (Mackie et al., 2000). 
Three negative emotions  anger, fear (or anxiety) and hate are associated with the 
development of political intolerance (Devos et al., 2003; Halperin et al., 2009; Mackie et al., 
2000). Negative emotions typically arise as a result of a perceived unpleasant change in one‟s 
environment. This change disrupts the individual‟s balance and prompts them to respond in a 
way that will restore this balance to normal. Thus, negative emotions “are related to the 
willingness to create some kind of change in the environment. Yet negative emotions differ 
from each other in the specific kind of change they endorse” (Halperin et al., 2009, p. 96). 
For instance, fear is more likely to prompt avoidant action tendencies in ingroup members, 
(Frijda et al., 1989; Halperin et al., 2009) while anger is likely to trigger more confrontational 
tendencies. However, it is important to note that anger is only associated with confrontational 
tendencies in some but not all cases (Mackie et al., 2000). “The aggressive action tendencies 
associated with anger are only one out of a group of alternative solutions” (Halperin et al., 
2009, p. 97).  
Hate may be more potent than anger when it comes to aggressive action tendencies. 
This is because anger is triggered by the deeds of outgroups, therefore the action tendencies 
elicited may not necessarily be geared towards harming the outgroup but rather towards 
correcting their actions. Hate on the other hand is triggered by the repeated perceived “evil” 
actions of the outgroup towards the ingroup and these actions eventually come to be seen as 
inherent attributes of the outgroup. Consequently, hatred is directed towards the outgroup, 
and not towards their actions as may be the case with anger, resulting in more aggressive 
action tendencies towards the outgroup (Halperin et al., 2009). 
Although many empirical studies have found that the various negative emotions are 
distinct in terms of their influence on peoples‟ action tendencies, it is important to note that a 
significant amount of research has found that this is not true of all cases. That is, negative 
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emotions are not always distinct from each other, and may sometimes exert similar effects on 
action tendencies (Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006 as cited in Petersen, 2010). For 
example, a study investigating factors that influence people‟s opinion on immigration policy 
found that anxiety and anger (in this sample) were related to each other as they loaded onto a 
common factor. The two emotions also had a similar effect on the participants‟ action 
tendencies when analysed separately. As a result, anger and anxiety were combined into one 
scale for this specific study (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008).  
The construct of political intolerance encompasses both avoidant and aggressive 
action tendencies and behaviours. For instance, intolerant individuals may avoid opponents 
and their views by denying them particular political rights such as the right to campaign in 
their community. On the other hand they may confront them by disrupting their political 
rallies. Thus, outgroup appraisals of strength or weakness could both theoretically lead to 
action tendencies that are part and parcel of political intolerance. Conversely, there is a line 
of reasoning that suggests otherwise  that it is only when outgroups are perceived as 
stronger than the ingroup that people may become intolerant towards them. This is because 
the strength of the outgroup makes them even more dangerous and threatening to the ingroup. 
In contrast, threat posed by weak outgroups would be less potent and the ingroup members 
may be more inclined to be tolerant of these groups.  
In their study on sociotropic threat and political intolerance, Gibson and Gouws 
(2003) found that when outgroup power was analysed as a threat variable, it was positively 
associated with tolerance. Thus when disliked outgroups were perceived as powerful, 
tolerance towards them increased. They suggested that people may tolerate strong enemies 
because it poses too much of a danger to express intolerance towards them. In line with this, 
it is possible that if the outgroup is perceived as more powerful, this may lead to the adoption 
of avoidant action tendencies that are not necessarily intolerant but protective in nature.  
In contrast, when Gibson and Gouws (2003) investigated the influence of outgroup 
power as a separate variable from threat, the effect of this variable proved to be different. 
They tested whether perceived outgroup power would have a “conditional effect on the 
relationship between perceived threat and intolerance” (Gibson & Gouws, 2003, p.69) and 
found that it did not. Hence they concluded that “the power of a group has little to do with the 
level of tolerance expressed toward it” (Gibson & Gouws, 2003, p.69).  
Strength of ingroup identification is another variable that may impact the intergroup 
emotions experienced by ingroups. 
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The role of ingroup identification 
How strongly individuals identify with their social group influences the quality (type) 
and intensity of emotion experienced by the ingroup (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007); 
strong identification increases negative emotions towards outgroups and increases positive 
emotions towards ingroups (Mackie et al., 2009). A study on male, English soccer fans found 
that the strength of identification that they felt towards their soccer team predicted the kind of 
emotion that they experienced. After losing a match, low identifiers experienced more 
sadness than anger while high identifiers experienced more anger than sadness. Those who 
experienced anger were more likely to confront fans of the rival soccer team, while those who 
experienced sadness were more likely to avoid fans of the rival soccer team. Strength of 
ingroup identification therefore influenced the quality or type of intergroup emotion that the 
soccer fans experienced as well as the associated action tendencies (Crisp et al., 2007). 
Another study investigating the role of intergroup emotion in bullying amongst 
children found that children who identified more strongly with their respective social group 
(bully group or victim group) experienced the socially shared emotion of their ingroup more 
intensely (Jones, Manstead, & Livingstone, 2009). This same study also brought out the fact 
that strength of ingroup identification influences the extent to which individuals adhere to the 
norms of their group. “Strong identification is associated with strong norm adherence” (Jones 
et al., 2009, p.855).  
Strength of ingroup identification has also been found to influence the extent to which 
individuals categorise themselves into social groups. Thus, how prototypical of the ingroup 
individuals perceive themselves to be is influenced by how highly they identify with the 
ingroup. As a result, identification influences the extent to which appraisals made are group 
rather than individual based (Mackie et al., 2009). 
 In addition, strength of ingroup identification influences the degree of emotional 
convergence within an ingroup when social identity is made salient. Empirical research has 
found that the more individuals identify with their ingroup, the more their emotion becomes 
similar (Mackie et al., 2009). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Intergroup emotions theory is supported by a large amount of empirical research. It also 
provides a comprehensive explanation of how intergroup threat and emotion may lead to the 
development of political intolerance. When individuals who have engaged in self-
categorisation are faced with a situation that endangers their social group, they may be more 
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inclined to interpret this threat as harmful even when it is not necessarily harmful to 
themselves as individuals. They may also experience negative emotions towards the source of 
threat and as a result become more inclined to express intolerance towards this source (Smith 
et al., 2007). Thus, it is possible that political intolerance may be a form of group and self 
preservation arising from a base of intergroup emotion precipitated by intergroup threat. In 
line with this, empirical research has found that different kinds of perceived threat elicit 
distinct emotions in individuals and groups. Threats to ones physical well-being for instance 
have been found to elicit fear and anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Furthermore, emotion 
has been associated with the development of political intolerance in some contexts 
(Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz, & Wyer, 1991).   
The study of political intolerance in relation to emotion is therefore not completely 
new. Kuklinski and colleagues (1991) evaluated whether people‟s tolerance judgements are 
influenced more by rational thought or affective responses to disliked outgroups. The 
participants in this study were divided into three experimental groups. The first group was 
asked to use their emotions to judge the actions of a disliked outgroup (affect group). The 
second group was asked to use rational thought in their judgements (consequence group), and 
the final group was not given any instruction on how to make their judgements about the 
outgroup (no instruction group). The political tolerance judgements of the affect group were 
found to be more similar to the no instruction group than the consequence group. Hence they 
concluded that people‟s tolerance judgements are influenced more by emotion than by 
rational thought. 
A more recent study investigated the role of extrinsic anxiety “in how and when 
people rely on predispositions and when they rely on [new information] in making political 
tolerance judgements” (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 2005, p. 949). In the 
context of high extrinsic anxiety, participants who had a strong predisposition of being 
tolerant were more tolerant towards outgroups than those who had no tolerance 
predisposition. However, when provided with new persuasive information, in the context of 
high anxiety, participants with strong tolerance predispositions were more willing to let go of 
their predispositions and rely on the new information received. They were therefore more 
prone to expressing intolerance when faced with new persuasive information in the context of 
high anxiety. 
Contrary to these findings, a study conducted in South Africa found that when 
individuals were presented with new information concerning civil liberties disputes, they 
relied more on their predispositions of threat in society than on the new information given to 
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them about the dispute when making political tolerance judgements (Gibson & Gouws, 
2001). In this case predispositions had more of an influence on tolerance than contemporary 
information, while in Marcus et al.‟s (2005) study the opposite was found to be true. Gibson 
and Gouws (2001) propose that this is the case because the South African context is very 
different to the contexts in which many of these studies have been conducted, such as the 
USA. “It is the South African context  the immediacy and realism of the threat posed by 
one‟s political enemies that is more influential, not the elements of the situation itself” 
(Gibson & Gouws, 2001, p.1069). They suggest that in the United States, the threat and 
realism of one‟s political enemies are less than in South Africa and thus people may be 
inclined to rely more on persuasive arguments arising out of civil liberties disputes rather 
than on their predispositions. The difference between these two studies accentuates the 
importance of the context of a study as highlighted in the first chapter of this thesis.   
 
SPECIFIC AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Aims 
The overall aim of this study was to investigate whether perceived racial threat and negative 
intergroup emotion play a role in the development of political intolerance in a post-apartheid 
generation of South Africans. With this in mind, three study objectives were formulated:  
1. to find an experimental stimulus that would effectively elicit perceived racial threat in 
the participants.  
2. to develop and refine a questionnaire measuring the different variables, that is 
perceived racial threat, intergroup emotion, outgroup appraisal, political intolerance, 
and racial identification. 
3.  to investigate the hypothesised relationships between these variables.  
 
Hypotheses 
This study tested the following hypotheses: 
1. Perceived racial threat is positively associated with the negative intergroup emotions 
of hate, anger and fear. 
2. Perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance. 
3. Negative intergroup emotion is positively related to political intolerance. 
4. Negative intergroup emotion mediates the relationship between perceived racial threat 
and political intolerance. 
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5. The kind of outgroup appraisal made will influence the kind of intergroup emotion 
expressed. When the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, participants 
will experience more fear than anger and hate. However, when the outgroup is 
appraised as weaker than the ingroup, participants will experience more hate and 
anger than fear.  
6. The strength of ingroup (racial) identification will influence the level of threat 
experienced by the participants and thus influence the intensity of intergroup 
emotions experienced and the amount of political intolerance expressed by them. 
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CHAPTER 3: PILOT STUDIES 
This study was conducted in two phases: a pilot phase, followed by the main study. 
The main study was a randomised experiment which tested the research hypotheses. 
Therefore, experimental stimuli were required for each condition as well as scales for the 
measurement of all the study variables. In light of this, four pilot studies were used to: (a) 
select appropriate experimental stimuli, and (b) develop scales for the main study. This 
chapter discusses these studies and describes how the various materials were selected or 
developed. It also presents the psychometric properties of the developed scales. The method 
of the main study is discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS 
Data from 164 participants was analysed during the four studies of the pilot phase 
with each one involving different numbers of participants. All of these were students at the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) and were assumed to be proficient in English as this is the 
official language of instruction at UCT. The first pilot study consisted of 36 participants; the 
second one, 116; the third, 10; and the final study, 2. The entire pilot sample included 44 
male (27%) and 120 female (73%) participants. The majority of these were White (55%), 
followed by Coloured (24%), Black (22%) and Asian (1%) individuals. The age range was 17 
to 54 years with a mean age of 20 (only three participants were above 30). 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL STIMULI 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the main purpose of this thesis was to investigate whether 
perceived racial threat (IV) precipitates negative emotions and political intolerance (DV). 
However, before this could be done, it was imperative to find or develop experimental stimuli 
that would effectively manipulate the independent variable. 
During the pilot phase, two experimental stimuli a video clip and a written piece/ blog 
 were tested. Both stimuli revolved around Julius Malema (a famous South African 
political figure) and were assessed to see if they would elicit racial threat in the participants, 
and if so, which would be more effective (that is, which would elicit more threat). The threat 
stimuli focused on Malema because he and his key supporters were the target outgroup in this 
study. Malema is the current president of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), the youth wing 
of the incumbent ruling party. He is well known in the South African context for the 
controversial, inflammatory statements that he has made in the recent past, targeting different 
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individuals and social groups (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009). He was therefore probably 
known to most of the participants and served as a good potential candidate for eliciting threat 
in them. Furthermore, because he is quite controversial, people may feel more comfortable 
with expressing intolerance towards him and his supporters.  
 
Video Experimental Stimulus 
This stimulus was a two minute video clip of Malema giving a press conference. In 
this clip, a BBC journalist asks a question that angers Malema who responds with insults and 
threats, some personal and others racial in nature. For example Malema shouts: “This is a 
building of a revolutionary party, and you know nothing of the revolution. So here you 
behave or else you jump...This is not a newsroom this, it‟s a revolutionary house and you 
don‟t come here with that tendency. Don‟t come here with that white tendency...if you‟ve got 
a tendency of undermining blacks even where you work, you‟re in the wrong place. And you 
can go out...you‟re a small boy, you can‟t do anything...GO OUT! Bastard! You bloody 
agent” (Tsele, 2010). After this tirade the journalist leaves the room as Malema orders 
security guards to throw him out. The video clip was aired on the local news and was sourced 
from the internet. It was therefore readily available and easily accessible in the public 
domain.  
 
Blog Experimental Stimulus 
The second stimulus was a written piece which was supposedly from an authoritative 
political blog about Julius Malema. In actual fact, it was a piece written by the researcher that 
incorporated a number of threatening statements Malema has made over the past few years. 
For example, “We are prepared to die for Zuma. Not only that, we are prepared to take up 
arms and kill for Zuma” (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009, p. 32). (Zuma was the presidential 
candidate for the ANC at the time). The piece also highlighted some of the controversial 
things that Malema has done and emphasised the power that he holds as ANC Youth League 
president. The material for this stimulus was largely drawn from Du Preez and Rossouw‟s 
(2009) book, The World According to Julius Malema as well as newspaper articles and the 
internet (to see the blog, refer to Questionnaire 1 in Appendix A). 
Although Malema is well known (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009), it was assumed that 
some people may not know who he is. Therefore, a short biography of him was included in 
the pilot study questionnaire with the rest of the materials. It informed the participants of who 
he is, what he does and how he came into power and ensured that all the participants had 
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enough information about him to adequately respond to the questionnaire. Once the 
experimental stimuli and biography were developed, construction of the scales commenced.       
  
SCALE DEVELOPMENT  
Five scales were required to measure the variables in this study. These were:  
 the political intolerance scale- main DV; 
 the perceived racial threat scale- main IV; 
 the intergroup emotion scale;  
 the outgroup appraisal scale; and 
 the racial identification scale. 
The development process of these scales is discussed below.  
     
Development of the Political Intolerance Scale 
The conceptualization of political intolerance and subsequent item generation were 
based on the findings of a qualitative pilot study and extant conceptual and empirical 
literature on this construct. There are two general approaches that are used to measure 
political intolerance in empirical research. The first measures intolerance towards a specific 
outgroup, for example a study in Russia examined intolerance towards communists and 
Fascists (Gibson, 1998). The second approach does not focus on a specific outgroup but 
allows participants to select their least liked group from a list of alternatives (Gibson & 
Gouws, 2003). Participants‟ tolerance towards this group is then assessed.  
These two approaches have been used to develop several political tolerance scales 
which have helped to provide a better understanding of the construct. However, none of these 
were appropriate for the particular context of this study. Scales which adopted the specific 
outgroup approach frequently had content which was tailored to the specific context of the 
study. For example, a study investigating intolerance towards Arab Americans and Muslims 
in the USA was conducted soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Therefore, the 
intolerance scale contained items such as: (a) Muslims should not be allowed to purchase or 
own guns, (b) Muslims should have their phones tapped by government, and (c) Muslims 
should be subject to more thorough searches in airports (Skitka, et al., 2004, p.749).  
Scales which adopt the least liked approach are more applicable to the context of this 
study, as they usually assess general features of political intolerance such as, whether the 
outgroup should be allowed to hold demonstrations (Gibson, 2006). However, most of these 
scales assess blatant forms of intolerance, for example, whether outgroups should exist as 
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political groups and whether members of outgroups should be allowed to stand as candidates 
for elected positions (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). This blatant form of intolerance has largely 
been assumed to be a phenomenon associated with conservative, less educated groups of 
people of low socio-economic status (Renfro et al., 2006; Sullivan et al., 1990 as cited in 
Shamir, 1991). As is the case with most university students in South Africa, the sample of 
this study is more educated than the general population and also over-represents the middle/ 
upper income groups. In addition, this sample was recruited from an institution that espouses 
liberal political values and allows a wide range of political groups to operate student 
organisations. It is thus a milieu in which political tolerance would be expected to be the 
norm (UCT values, 2001). In light of this, it was imperative to develop a scale that also 
assesses subtle forms of political intolerance.  
As a first step to gathering information for the development of this scale, a qualitative 
pilot study was conducted. This study collected students‟ views on political intolerance. 
Thirty six respondents were given a short questionnaire sporting two open-ended items: “In 
your opinion what is political intolerance?” and “Please write down some examples of 
political intolerance to illustrate your answer to question 1.” Emergent findings and extant 
literature (Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Gibson, 1998; Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Halperin et al., 
2009) were then used to generate dimensions of political tolerance which in turn informed the 
specific items of the scale. These dimensions were: (a) allowing all groups the right to speak 
or express themselves, (b) allowing all groups to stand for political positions or serve in high 
positions of government, and (c) allowing all groups to assemble and/or demonstrate. 
The generated pool of intolerance items focused on Julius Malema and his key 
supporters. To reduce acquiescent response bias some of the items were positively worded 
while others were negatively worded. In addition, they were presented in a particular order to 
ensure that the negatively and positively worded items were mixed within the scale. This 
order also ensured that the more emotive items appeared in the middle or at the end of the 
scale (Rattray & Jones, 2007). Some examples of the generated items are:  
 Politicians like Julius Malema should not be allowed to publicly criticise my party 
and its leaders.  
 Politicians like Malema should be allowed to make speeches in my community, even 
if their speeches contradict the values of my community. 
 Politicians like Julius Malema should be allowed to hold political rallies in any 
communities they wish, including mine. 
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 Julius Malema and his key supporters should be allowed to do door-to-door 
campaigns in my community. 
 Politicians like Julius Malema should be allowed to stand as candidates for the 
Presidency of South Africa. (See section F of questionnaire 1 in Appendix A for the 
rest of the intolerance items).    
 
The developed scale covered both blatant and subtle forms of political intolerance and 
contained 24 items. Discussion of the items with a social psychologist with extensive 
experience in scale construction, led to the modification of some of the items in terms of their 
content, relevance and clarity of wording, thereby improving their validity (Rattray & Jones, 
2007). Each item was presented on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly 
disagree (7).  
 
Development of the Racial Threat Scale 
The perceived racial threat scale was designed to measure the level of perceived racial 
threat amongst participants. In doing so, it also acted as a manipulation check: by measuring 
the level of threat amongst the participants in the various experimental conditions, it was 
possible to determine whether the different experimental stimuli had the effect that they were 
supposed to have.  
Items for this scale were based on the definition that perceived racial threat is when one 
racial group believes that another racial group poses a danger to their general well-being and 
goal attainment (Riek et al., 2006). There are a number of existing intergroup threat scales of 
high validity and reliability (Dixon et al., 2010; Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Halperin et al., 
2009; Stephan et al., 1999). However, many of these scales are tailored to the specific 
contexts of their studies. For example, in a study assessing threat perceptions in Israel, 
participants were asked to report to what extent the outgroup: (a) endangers Israel‟s security, 
(b) Israeli democracy, and (c) Israel‟s Jewish character (Halperin et al., 2009). In light of this, 
it was essential to develop a racial threat scale that was tailored to the context of this study, 
especially with regards to the target outgroup. Published scales and extant literature were 
used to generate several dimensions of the racial threat construct and these informed the 
development of the racial threat items. The dimensions included perceived threat to: 
 the physical well-being of one‟s ethnic group; 
 the power of one‟s ethnic group; 
 the amount of resources available to one‟s ethnic group; and 
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 the values and culture of one‟s ethnic group.  
 
The generated threat items were positively and negatively worded to minimise 
acquiescent response bias. They were also presented in a particular order to ensure that the 
positively and negatively worded items were mixed within the scale and that the more 
emotive items appeared in the middle or towards the end of the scale (Rattray & Jones, 2007). 
The content and wording of the items were evaluated by the expert and the items were 
modified accordingly. Those which did not adequately reflect the racial threat construct were 
removed at this stage and those which had unclear or inappropriate wording were re-worded. 
This helped to improve the validity of the items (De Vaus, 2002).  
Some examples of the preliminary racial threat items are:  
 Julius Malema and his key supporters only want to empower certain groups in 
South Africa. 
 Julius Malema and his key supporters respect the property and ownership rights of 
all ethnic groups in South Africa.  
 As a leader, Julius Malema genuinely tries to address the needs and issues of all 
ethnic groups including mine. (For the full racial threat scale, refer to Section C of 
Questionnaire 1 in Appendix A). 
Each item was presented on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly 
disagree (7). The final draft of this scale contained 10 items. 
 
Development of the Intergroup Emotion scale 
The items in this scale were drawn from existing intergroup emotion scales (Halperin et 
al., 2009; Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). The purpose of this scale was 
to measure participants‟ degree of affect towards the target outgroup. Hence they were asked 
to report the extent to which they feel particular emotions when they think about Malema, his 
key supporters and their behaviour. An example is, “To what extent do you feel anxious 
when you think about Julius Malema, his key supporters and their behaviour?” The 
participants selected one out of seven possible responses ranging from not at all (1) to 
extremely (7) for each item. The scale consisted of four sub-scales which contained a number 
of items that reflected the overarching emotions of fear, anger, hate or happiness. 
 Fear subscale: anxious, afraid, worried, and uneasy.  
 Anger subscale: irritated, furious, displeased and angry. 
 Hate subscale: hostile, disgusted and hateful. 
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 Happiness subscale: happy, proud, calm, and joyful.  
The items were evaluated by the expert to ensure that the content was valid, relevant and 
clearly worded (De Vaus, 2002). (For the whole scale, see Section D of Questionnaire 1 in 
Appendix A). 
 
Development of the Outgroup Appraisal Scale 
The purpose of this scale was to measure participants‟ perceptions of how strong the 
target outgroup is as compared to their ingroup. Thus, it assessed whether participants 
perceived the target outgroup as stronger or weaker than their ingroup. There are a number of 
existing outgroup appraisal scales of high validity and reliability (Mackie et al., 2000). 
However, many of these scales are tailored to the specific contexts of their studies and are 
thus not applicable to the context of this study. A study by Mackie and colleagues (2000, p. 
604), for instance, assessed individuals‟ perceptions of outgroup support using items that 
revolved around arguments presented by the outgroup. Some of these are: (a) which group 
has more persuasive arguments, (b) which group has more coherent arguments? and (c) 
which group has more relevant arguments?         
Extant literature and published measures were used to generate dimensions of the 
outgroup appraisal construct (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie et al., 2009). These included 
perceptions about:  
 how much influence the outgroup has;  
 the amount resources available to the outgroup as compared to the ingroup; and  
  how much collective support the outgroup has in society.  
These dimensions were then used as a framework for the construction of the appraisal 
items. These were evaluated by the expert, whose feedback was used to improve their content 
and clarity of wording. The preliminary measure comprised five questions to which 
participants responded either: “Malema‟s faction in the ANCYL” or “My preferred political 
group.”       
1. Who has more influence over government decisions? 
2. Who has more support for their views from the South African public? 
3. Who has more access to financial resources? 
4. Who has more positive coverage in the media? 
5. Who has more power overall within the current SA (South African) political 
context?  
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Development of the Ingroup (racial) Identification Scale 
This measure was designed to assess how strongly individuals identify with their racial 
group and was based on the Identification with a Psychological Group (IDPG) Scale 
developed by Mael and Tetrick (1992 as cited in Greene, 2004). The IDPG has been found to 
be applicable to a diverse range of social groups and was therefore deemed to be a suitable 
model for the items in this study (Greene, 2004). It also has high internal consistency with a 
Cronbach‟s alpha of .85. Some of the items from the IDPG scale were reworded to make 
them appropriate for the context of this study and a few other items measuring degree of 
affect towards one‟s ingroup were added to the identification scale. (See Appendix B for the 
IDPG scale).  
After discussion of the items with the expert, ambiguous items were modified with 
regards to their wording and content to make them clearer and to improve their validity 
(Rattray & Jones, 2007). The preliminary racial identification scale was made up of 9 items 
including: 
 I‟m very interested in what others think about my ethnic group.  
 When I talk about my ethnic group, I usually say “we rather than “they.” 
 Being a member of this ethnic group is an important part of who I am. 
(See Section G in Questionnaire 1 of Appendix A for the full racial identification scale). 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL STUDY MATERIALS 
        Once all the scales were developed, additional measures which were required for the 
study the self-categorisation prime, support gauge and demographics   were developed. 
These are briefly outlined below. 
   
Self-categorisation prime 
This item was designed to trigger self-categorisation in the participants of the study. 
The respondents were asked “What ethnic group do you belong to?” This kind of question is 
effective in making particular social identities salient and has been found to lead to self-
categorisation in a number of studies (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Ray, et al., 2008).  
 
Support Gauge 
This item was designed to assess each participant‟s level of support for the target 
outgroup. Participants were asked, “On a scale of 1-10, indicate your level of support for 
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Julius Malema as a political leader.” The lower end of the scale „1‟ indicted no support while 
the higher end of the scale „10‟ indicated very strong support.    
 
Demographics 
Participants were asked to provide demographic information about their age, sex, and 
nationality.  
 
GROUP COMPARISONS PILOT STUDY 
Once all the preliminary materials were developed, they were combined in a preliminary 
questionnaire which was tested in the group comparisons pilot study. The materials were 
presented in the following order: 
1. Self categorisation prime. 
2. Support gauge. 
3. Racial threat stimuli (video or blog) 
4. Perceived racial threat scale.  
5. Intergroup emotion scale. 
6. Outgroup appraisal Scale. 
7. Racial identification scale. 
8. Demographics. 
A sample similar to that of the main study (psychology undergraduates) was used 
because “as far as possible, pretesting should be conducted with people who resemble those 
to whom the questionnaire will finally be given” (De Vaus, 2002, p. 117). This study had a 
number of aims: 
1. to test whether the video and blog stimuli would elicit racial threat in the pilot 
participants;  
2. to test which of these stimuli was more effective in eliciting threat in participants; and   
3. to refine the various scales in the preliminary questionnaire in terms of wording, 
content and reliability. 
This study was a randomised experiment with four experimental groups. Three of these 
were used to test whether the blog and video stimuli increased racial threat in participants. 
The first group was exposed to the blog (blog group), the second group watched the video 
clip (video group) and the third group was a control group in which participants were not 
exposed to any threat stimuli. These groups allowed us to test whether there was a significant 
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difference in the amount of threat elicited by the blog and the video clip and if these amounts 
were significantly higher than “normal” (level of threat in the control group). 
In addition, it was thought that perhaps the racial threat measure could in itself 
potentially elicit racial threat in participants (even when they were not exposed to any threat 
stimuli) and thus confound the political intolerance results. To test this, a second control 
group was used in this study. Like the first control, this group was not exposed to any threat 
stimuli. In addition, the racial threat scale was not included in their preliminary questionnaire. 
Over 150 participants were recruited for this study. However, incomplete 
questionnaires and respondents with high levels of support for Malema were excluded 
leaving a final total of 116 participants. Of this sample 22% were male and 78% were female. 
The majority were White participants (61%), followed by Coloured (22%), Black (15%) and 
Asian (2%) participants. The age range was 17 to 54 years with a mean age of 20 (only three 
participants were above 30). High supporters (scoring 5 or above on the support gauge) were 
excluded because it was assumed that they would be less likely to express intolerance 
towards Malema (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). The participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the four experimental groups:     
1. Blog group: read the blog and then completed the questionnaire. 
2. Video group: watched the video clip and then completed the questionnaire. 
3. Control Group 1: not exposed to any of the threat stimuli and only completed the 
questionnaire. 
4. Control Group 2: not exposed to any threat stimuli and the racial threat scale was not 
included in their preliminary questionnaire. 
  
Results of the Group Comparisons Pilot Study   
The collected data was cleaned and entered into a statistics program (STATISTICA). 
Following this, principal axis factor analysis (with varimax normalized rotation), inter-item 
reliability analysis and item analysis were used to investigate whether the scales contained 
any weak items. These procedures were selected as a number of theorists have proposed that 
they are some of the best methods to use for refining measures (Costello & Osborne, 2005; 
Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). In addition, they have been used in a number of studies to 
develop highly reliable and valid scales in different populations (Renfro et al., 2006).  
Principal axis factor analysis is not a widely used method for scale development. A 
large amount of literature on best practices for scale development indicates that principal 
components analysis (PCA) is the more popular method but is not necessarily the best one to 
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use (Costello & Osborne, 2005). PCA is thought to be less appropriate than factor analysis 
for scale development because it “does not attempt to model the structure of correlations 
among the original variables” (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum,& Strahan, 1999, p.275). 
Furthermore, “under certain conditions, PCA may overestimate factor loadings and result in 
erroneous decisions about the number of factors or items to retain” (Worthington & 
Whittaker, 2006, p. 819). It also does not make a distinction between the shared variance and 
unique variance of the variables. Thus the components that are yielded by this kind of 
analysis are not actually underlying variables (Fabrigar et al., 1999).  
The goal of the scale refinement process in this study was to detect underlying factors in 
the data and to determine which items were related to them. It was therefore more appropriate 
to use one of the factor analysis methods rather than PCA. A large amount of literature 
suggests that if data is normally distributed, maximum likelihood factor analysis is the best 
method to use. However, if data is not normally distributed, then principal axis factor analysis 
is best (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). A considerable amount 
of the pilot study data was non-normal. For example, the distribution of several racial threat 
items was skewed. Thus principal axis factor analysis was the method of choice. 
Several criteria were used to identify weak items. In the inter-item reliability analyses 
three criteria were used: items with low inter-item correlations (below .3), items with low 
item-total correlations (below .3), and items which if deleted, would result in an increase in 
the Cronbach‟s alphas of the scales (Costello & Osborne, 2005). 
In the factor analyses, weak items were highlighted by low loadings (below .3) onto the 
relevant factors. In addition, items which did not load onto any factors or which loaded 
highly onto more than one factor were also regarded as weak items (Costello & Osborne, 
2005). Finally in the item analyses, any items which had particular response options that were 
selected by a majority of the participants were deemed to be weak items, as this suggested 
that they had poor discriminatory power (Rattray & Jones, 2007). Qualitative analysis of the 
items was also used to determine whether there was duplication of items within the scale. 
 
Perceived racial threat scale refinement results 
Inter-item reliability analysis on the racial threat measure revealed that the scale had high 
internal consistency. The Cronbach‟s alpha was .87, all the items had item-total correlations 
above .3 and most of the inter-item correlations were above .3. However, this analysis 
indicated that two items (C2 and C4) were possibly weak items as the Cronbach‟s alpha of 
the scale would increase if any of them was deleted (See Table 1). 
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The scale‟s 10 items (C1 to C10) were submitted to a principal axis factor analysis with 
varimax rotation. This revealed that one factor was dominant, as it was the only factor with 
an eigen value higher than 1 (4.67) and explained 46.72% of the variance in items. 
Examination of the scree test revealed that there was a second factor that was quite strong. 
Although it had an eigen value less than 1 (.81), it accounted for 8.09% of the variance in 
items. In light of this, both one factor and two factor extractions were conducted. The two 
factor solution revealed that all the items with the exception of three (C1, C4 and C5) loaded 
above .3 onto the first factor. Item C1 and C5 loaded highly onto the second factor while item 
C4 did not load onto any of the factors. This suggested that these may be weak items. More 
importantly, the two factor solution indicated that a one factor solution may be more 
appropriate as the two factor solution resulted in a large number of cross loadings. When one 
factor was extracted, all the items loaded above .3 onto it. However, item C2 and C4 had 
markedly lower loadings than the rest of the items (see Table 1). 
Item analysis revealed that three items (C1, C5 and C6) had poor discriminatory power as 
many participants gave the same response to these items. The distribution curves of these 
items were negatively skewed.  
In general, the various analyses revealed that five of the items  C1, C2, C4, C5 and 
C6  in this scale were not very strong. Due to their poor discriminatory power, items C1, C5 
and C6 were removed from the scale. However, item C2 and C4 were kept as part of the scale 
because they tapped into aspects of perceived racial threat that none of the other items did. 
Item C4 was the only blatant measure of threat and Item C2 was the only one that revolved 
around the threat of aggression towards one‟s ethnic group: 
 C4: Politicians like Malema pose a threat to my ethnic group in South Africa. 
 C2: Julius Malema and his key supporters instigate conflict between the different 
ethnic groups. 
 In addition, these items had moderate relationships with the other items and were 
therefore not extremely weak items. The final scale had a high Cronbach‟s alpha of .89 and 
contained seven items.   
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Table 1 
Racial Threat Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses      
Item Mean SD Reliability Single- 
factor 
loading 
Rotated loadings 
from two-factor 
solution 
Item-total 
correlation 
Alpha if 
deleted 
1 2 
C1
a 
5.54 1.26 .61 .86 .66 .13 .90 
C2
 
5.14 1.55 .39 .88 .42 .49 .09 
C3
 
5.81 1.09 .65 .86 .72 .41 .61 
C4
 
4.47 1.54 .35 .88 .37 .27 .24 
C5
a 
5.39 1.32 .65 .86 .68 .28 .72 
C6
a 
5.88 1.15 .63 .86 .67 .61 .32 
C7
 
5.36 1.16 .81 .85 .87 .64 .57 
C8
 
5.74 1.22 .62 .86 .68 .72 .23 
C9
 
5.63 1.16 .79 .85 .83 .87 .31 
C10
 
5.24 1.18 .64 .86 .71 .50 .49 
Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface. 
a 
Item not selected for final seven-item scale.  
 
Intergroup emotion scale refinement results 
Inter-item reliability analysis indicated that the Intergroup emotion scale had high internal 
consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha = 0.77). All the items with the exception of two (proud and 
overjoyed) had item-total correlations above .3, indicating relatedness between most of the 
items. This analysis also revealed that if any of the happiness items were deleted, the 
Cronbach‟s alpha of the scale would improve (see Table 2). It was assumed that because 
happiness is a positive emotion, while the other three are negative emotions, the happiness 
items were less related to the rest of the items in the scale (Brader et al., 2008).   
Although it had been predicted that this scale would have four distinct sub-scales (fear, 
anger, hate and happiness), a principal axis factor analysis indicated that there were three and 
not four dominant factors amongst the items. The first had an eigen value of 5.76 and 
accounted for 38.43% of the variance in items. The second had an eigen value of 1.33 and 
accounted for 8.89% of the variance, while the third had an eigen value of 1.02 and 
accounted for 6.78% of the variance. (These were the only factors with eigen values higher 
than one). The fear items loaded onto the first factor, the happiness items (with the exception 
of the item „calm‟) loaded onto the second and the anger and hate items loaded onto the third 
factor. Indeed, empirical research has found that in some cases, negative emotions like anger 
and hate are not distinct from each other (Brader et al., 2008).  
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This analysis flagged the items calm, irritated and displeased as weak items. „Irritated‟ 
and „displeased‟ had similar loadings on more than one factor while the item „calm‟ loaded 
onto the fear factor rather than the happy factor (See Table 2). Consequently, the item „calm‟ 
was removed from happiness sub-scale. On consultation with the expert, the item „displeased‟ 
was replaced by the item „outraged‟ as it was a better reflection of the overarching emotion of 
anger. Irritated remained as part of the anger scale. The anger and hate items were not 
combined into one sub-scale at this stage, but remained as distinct sub-scales because another 
round of scale refinement was going to be conducted using the main study data. This 
therefore provided the opportunity for further investigating whether the anger and hate items 
should be combined into one sub-scale. All the four sub-scales were of high internal 
consistency and the final scale comprised 14 items (see Table 5). 
 
Table 2 
Intergroup Emotion Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses      
Item Mean SD Reliability Rotated loadings from three-
factor solution 
Item-total 
correlation 
Alpha if 
deleted 
1 2 3 
Anxious 
 
4.69 1.51 .62 .73 .83 .08 .26 
Irritated 
 
5.80 1.21 .56 .74 .45 .42 .39 
Hostile 
 
4.28 1.48 .65 .73 .39 .14 .57 
Happy 
 
1.88 0.94 -.52 .81 -.20 -.55 -.44 
Worried  5.19 1.58 .57 .74 .72 .15 .26 
Furious 
 
4.44 1.77 .68 .72 .26 .04 .77 
Disgust 
 
4.98 1.66 .61 .73 .19 .21 .69 
Proud 
 
1.63 1.14 -.25 .79 -.11 -.77 -.11 
Uneasy 
 
5.10 1.40 .59 .74 .53 .29 .37 
Displeased 5.33 1.60 .42 .75 .20 .36 .40 
Hatred 
 
3.33 1.71 .56 .74 .22 .00 .65 
Calm
a 
2.85 1.35 -.37 .81 -.51 -.15 -.07 
Afraid 
 
4.07 1.61 .54 .74 .70 .02 .23 
Angry 
 
4.69 1.51 .58 .74 .14 .25 .69 
Overjoyed 1.40 0.78 -.15 .78 -.06 -.76 -.05 
Note. Factor loadings >.4 are in boldface. 
a 
Item not selected for final fourteen-item scale.  
 
Political Intolerance scale refinement results 
 Inter-item reliability analysis on the political intolerance items indicated that the scale 
had high internal consistency with a Cronbach‟s alpha of .94. All the items except F15 had 
item-total correlations above .3 (see Table 3). In addition, if any items were deleted from the 
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scale (with the exception of F7, F15 and F24) this would result in a decrease in the alpha of 
the scale.  
 Exploratory factor analysis with principal axis extraction of factors with eigen values 
of greater than one revealed a two factor solution. The first factor had an eigen value of 8.65 
and accounted for 36.02% of the variance in items. The second had an eigen value of 1.26 
and accounted for 5.24% of the variance. Although there were two factors with eigen values 
higher than 1, only one of these was dominant. Most of the items (with the exception of F15, 
F22 and F23) loaded above .3 onto the first factor. In addition, most items which loaded onto 
both factors, loaded more highly onto the first factor (see Table 3). This therefore suggested 
that a one factor solution was more appropriate. A one factor solution revealed a strong 
relatedness between the items, as they all (with the exception of F15) loaded above .3 onto 
this factor. Both the factor and inter-item reliability analyses flagged item F15 as a weak 
item. However, it was kept in the scale because it was one of the only two items that 
measured political intolerance in terms of aggression towards the target outgroup. In addition, 
since a second round of scale refinement was going to be conducted in the main study, there 
was another opportunity to test whether it was truly weak or if this was an effect of using this 
particular sample; if found to be weak it would be removed from the scale.  
Item analysis revealed that some of the items F4, F12, F17, F18 and F20  had poor 
discriminatory power. These were removed, leaving 19 items in the scale. Due to the fact that 
the scale was still quite long, a qualitative analysis of the remaining items was conducted and 
items which were duplicated were removed from the scale. For example item F13 was 
removed from the scale because it was highly similar to item F3.  
 F13: The government should be able to prohibit the expression of beliefs and 
values that it feels are offensive to its citizens. 
 F3: The government should have the right to silence politicians like Julius 
Malema who say very controversial things. 
In the same vein, items F7, F8 and F16 were also removed, leaving a final scale of 15 
items with high internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha = .92).    
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Table 3 
Political Intolerance Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses      
Item Mean SD Reliability Single 
factor 
loading 
Rotated loadings 
from two-factor 
solution 
Item-total 
correlation 
Alpha if 
deleted 
 1 2 
F1
 
4.48 1.74 .68 .93 .67 .69 .12 
F2
 
4.30 1.55 .69 .93 .63 .57 .25 
F3
 
4.64 1.83 .71 .93 .71 .66 .26 
F4
a 
2.92 1.22 .50 .93 .48 .44 .19 
F5
 
4.89 1.43 .70 .93 .67 .63 .24 
F6
 
3.86 1.54 .72 .93 .69 .72 .12 
F7
a 
3.16 1.65 .45 .94 .41 .53 -.12 
F8
a 
4.47 1.47 .78 .93 .73 .64 .35 
F9
 
3.86 1.32 .81 .93 .84 .81 .26 
F10
 
4.24 1.34 .65 .93 .58 .41 .46 
F11
 
3.92 1.49 .75 .93 .68 .73 .08 
F12
a 
3.08 1.31 .44 .93 .46 .38 .26 
F13
a 
4.28 1.55 .57 .93 .56 .50 .25 
F14
 
5.18 1.71 .62 .93 .62 .42 .57 
F15
 
4.22 1.33 .05 .94 .04 -.03 .15 
F16
a 
4.68 1.24 .63 .93 .62 .51 .38 
F17
a 
3.73 1.19 .63 .93 .65 .58 .29 
F18
a 
5.00 1.40 .73 .93 .74 .66 .34 
F19 4.22 1.29 .59 .93 .60 .53 .29 
F20
a 
4.34 1.76 .67 .93 .67 .67 .16 
F21
 
2.85 1.18 .42 .93 .34 .36 .04 
F22
 
4.64 1.35 .54 .93 .51 .19 .77 
F23
 
5.53 1.27 .47 .93 .48 .17 .74 
F24
 
4.14 1.45 .38 .94 .43 .30 .35 
Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface. 
a 
Item not selected for final fifteen-item scale.  
 
Racial Identification scale refinement results 
Inter-item reliability analysis revealed that the racial identification scale had high internal 
consistency. The Cronbach‟s alpha was .83 and all the items had item- total correlations 
above .3. In addition, if any item was deleted, it would result in a drop in the Cronbach‟s 
alpha of the scale (see Table 4). Principal axis factor analysis indicated that there was one 
dominant factor with an eigen value higher than 1. This factor accounted for 40.02% of the 
variance and all the items loaded above .35 onto it. This suggested a strong relatedness 
between all the items in the scale. Item analysis revealed that one of the items (G7) had poor 
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discriminatory power. Therefore, this item was removed from the scale leaving a final scale 
of eight items with high internal consistency (see Table 5). 
  
Table 4 
Racial Identification Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses      
Item Mean SD Reliability Single- 
factor 
loading 
Rotated loadings 
from two-factor 
solution 
Item-total 
correlation 
Alpha if 
deleted 
1 2 
G1
 
4.99 1.16 .31 .83 .35 .27 .26 
G2
 
5.03 1.21 .42 .82 .45 .28 .33 
G3
 
4.52 1.49 .48 .82 .49 .14 .62 
G4 5.16 1.32 .69 .79 .78 .56 .53 
G5 4.36 1.43 .75 .78 .80 .39 .81 
G6 5.31 1.03 .70 .79 .83 .88 .29 
G7
a 
5.38 0.93 .65 .80 .77 .87 .23 
G8 4.14 1.09 .53 .80 .55 .35 .39 
G9 3.95 1.25 .35 .83 .37 .13 .36 
Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface. 
a 
Item not selected for final seven-item scale.  
 
Table 5 
Summary of Scale Psychometric Properties  
Scale Cronbach‟s alphas Average 
inter-item 
correlation 
of refined 
scales 
Number of 
preliminary 
items 
Number 
of items in 
refined 
scales 
Preliminary 
scales 
Refined scales 
1. Perceived racial 
threat 
.87 .89 .54 10 7 
2. Intergroup emotion 
 
.77 .77 
*
.15 15 14 
 Fear .85 .85 .58 4 4 
 Anger .76 .76 .50 4 4 
 Hate .73 .73 .50 3 3 
 Happiness .66 .74 .51 4 3 
3. Political 
intolerance 
.93 .92 .41 24 15 
4. Racial 
identification 
.82 .83 .42 9 8 
*The average inter-item correlation for the intergroup emotion scale was low due to the fact that this scale was 
composed of four subscales tapping into different kinds of emotion. Inter-item reliability analyses on each of 
these subscales indicated that they had high internal consistency as can be seen in the table.  
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Group comparison tests results  
Once the scales were refined, a one way ANOVA was conducted on the racial threat 
scale scores as delivered by the refined scales. Therefore racial threat was the dependent 
variable while the independent variable was the group that participants belonged to (blog, 
video or control group). This analysis indicated that there was a significant effect, F (2, 83) = 
7.83, p < .001, 
2 = .16. A Tukey‟s HSD test revealed that the blog group (M =6.09, SD = 
0.71) had significantly higher threat levels than the video group (M =5.41, SD = 1.07) and 
Control Group 1 (M = 5.29, SD =0.74). There was no significant difference between the 
video group and Control Group 1. These results suggested that the blog was the better 
stimulus to use in the main study. (Control Group 2 was not included in this analysis because 
it did not have a racial threat measure). 
The results also showed that even though the participants in Control Group 1 were not 
exposed to any threat stimuli, they still experienced a considerable amount of threat. Their 
threat levels were not significantly different from those of the video participants. In addition, 
a one way ANOVA on political intolerance indicated that th re was no significant difference 
between the groups, F (3, 112) = 0.95, p = .42. Thus, the amount of political intolerance 
expressed by all four groups was quite similar, despite the fact that some groups had been 
exposed to threat stimuli and others hadn‟t. This hinted that it would probably be more 
effective to use a different kind of control group in the main study, one which would reduce 
racial threat in control group members. It was hoped that this would push the threat levels of 
the experimental and control group in the main study farther apart and in doing so, make the 
effect of the different threat levels on political intolerance clear. In light of this, the search for 
an additional stimulus that would reduce racial threat in the control group began. 
Although it had been predicted that the video clip would increase racial threat in the 
participants, this did not seem to be the case. As mentioned above, there was no significant 
difference between the video and control group. During the data collection process, it was 
noticed that many of the participants seemed to find the video clip amusing. Some even 
laughed aloud as they watched the clip. It is possible then that the participants‟ levels of 
threat were reduced by humour. Indeed, empirical research has found that humour does 
reduce anxiety and threat (Ford, Ferguson, Brooks, & Hagadone, 2004). To test whether this 
was true for the video group, a qualitative study was conducted on participants‟ views on the 
video clip. 
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VIDEO PILOT STUDY 
In this study, 10 participants were recruited to watch the video clip of Julius Malema. 
After this, they were given a short questionnaire with three items to complete. The first item 
was, “What opinion does the video give you of Malema?” the second was “After watching 
this video, in what ways do you see Malema?” and the third was “On a scale of 1-10, how do 
you rate this particular video in the aspect of “Funniness?” 
Many of the respondents reported that the video showed Malema to be authoritative, 
racist and rude. However, they also said that it showed him to be a joker, unfocused and 
foolish. Even though most of the participants saw Malema in a negative light after watching 
the clip, they still found it amusing. On a scale of 1 to 10, six participants rated the video 
above 4 on funniness. Only three participants did not find the video funny at all. These results 
therefore supported the notion that humour counteracted some of the threat elicited by the 
video clip in the group comparisons study, thereby leading to reduced perceived threat in the 
video group. In light of this, the idea that humour could be used to suppress threat in the 
control group of the main study was formulated and a new humorous stimulus was sourced. 
This stimulus was a cartoon strip about Malema (Francis & Rico, 2008). It painted a 
comical version of Malema who does silly things that injure his political career and was 
distinct to the blog in that it did not portray Malema as a powerful political figure. Rather, it 
portrayed him as someone who should not be taken too seriously (see Questionnaire 2 in 
Appendix A for the cartoon strip). The stimulus was piloted on two participants to test 
whether it was actually funny. 
 
CARTOON PILOT STUDY 
The participants in this study were given the cartoon strip to read. They were then 
asked a few short questions about it. Both participants seemed to find the stimulus amusing as 
they laughed aloud when they read it. They also reported that the strip portrayed Malema as a 
“joke” or “a clown” and not much of a threat. The results therefore indicated that the cartoon 
strip would be an effective stimulus to use for the control group in the main study as it was 
humorous and would therefore probably reduce racial threat in this group (Ford et al., 2004).  
 
PILOT SUMMARY 
The piloting process led to the selection of two threat stimuli for the main study: the 
blog for the increased threat group and the cartoon strip for the reduced threat group. It also 
ensured that valid and reliable measures were developed for the study variables. That is: (a) 
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the perceived racial threat scale, (b) the intergroup emotion scale, (c) the outgroup appraisal 
scale, (d) the racial identification scale, and (d) the political intolerance scale. Additional 
materials required for the main study  the Malema biography, self-categorisation prime and 
support gauge  were also developed during this process. The next chapter presents the 
method of the main study.     
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD - MAIN STUDY 
This chapter presents the method of the main study, which includes a description of 
the design, participants, sampling strategy, procedure and data analysis methods used. Ethical 
issues pertaining to this study are discussed at the end of the chapter.  
 
DESIGN 
The main study was a randomised experiment (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) in 
which participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups: the increased threat or 
reduced threat group. The increased threat group was exposed to the blog stimulus while the 
reduced threat group was exposed to the cartoon stimulus. This design was employed with 
the objective of isolating the effect of the independent variable (perceived racial threat) on the 
dependent variables (intergroup emotion and political intolerance) (Rossi, Lipsey, & 
Freeman, 2004). In addition, this design allowed for the exploration of multiple relationships 
between all the different variables using correlation and regression analyses. Thus, it 
provided a way to establish cause and effect as well as build a model predicting political 
intolerance. 
Perceived racial threat was the main independent variable with two levels: increased 
threat and reduced threat. Negative intergroup emotion was investigated both as a dependent 
variable in hypothesis one and mediator variable in hypothesis four. The influence of 
outgroup appraisal as an independent variable was explored in hypothesis five (Mackie, 
Devos, & Smith, 2000), while racial identification was employed as the independent variable 
in the examination of hypothesis six. Political intolerance was the focal dependent variable in 
this study (see Chapter 2 for all the hypotheses). 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
The target population, all psychology undergraduates at UCT, was selected for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it was assumed that most of this population would meet the “post-
apartheid generation” criterion of the study, which was the case. The mean age of this sample 
was 20 years, with a range of 17 to 38 (only four participants were above 30 and most were 
below 23). Secondly, students are readily accessible, and provided a large population to 
sample from.  
Data was collected from 198 individuals. However, the final sample consisted of 123 
participants as a reasonable amount of data was excluded for various reasons. Firstly, 
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participants with large amounts of missing data were excluded from analysis. Secondly, 
because the stimuli used to elicit racial threat in this experiment revolved around a black 
political figure (Julius Malema), it was assumed that black participants would experience 
little or no racial threat. Therefore their data was excluded. Thirdly, similar to the group 
comparisons pilot study, strong supporters of Malema were excluded (Gibson & Gouws, 
2003). In addition, data from non-South Africans was excluded to ensure that the views 
collected were those of South Africans. Finally, data from participants in the reduced threat 
group who did not find the cartoon strip humorous was excluded. This was because humour 
was the tool that was supposed to reduce racial threat in this group. Thus, if some participants 
did not find the cartoon funny, it may have meant that their threat levels would still be high, 
and this may have confounded the results of the study.             
Although the number of participants in the final sample was not as large as hoped, it 
still proved to be adequate. A number of statisticians have proposed that a sample of at least 
10 participants per variable is adequate for credible statistical analysis to be conducted 
(Lunenburg & Irby, 2008). In this sample there were at least 15 participants per variable and 
over 100 participants in total. This sample size was satisfactory even for statistical analyses 
that are quite sensitive to outliers and sample size such as linear regression (Tredoux, 2002).  
There were 68 participants in the increased threat group and 55 in the reduced threat 
group. Of these, 30 were male (24%) and 93 were female (76%). Eighty participants (65%) 
were White, 30 (24%) were Coloured, 10 (8%) were Indian and 3 (2%) were of Chinese 
descent. Although it would have been beneficial to have equal numbers of participants in 
each sex and racial grouping, time constraints prevented this imbalance from being corrected 
once it was discovered. More importantly, the distribution in the sample was a reflection of 
the UCT psychology undergraduate population which has more female and white students.   
Convenience sampling was used in the selection of participants (Lunenburg & Irby, 
2008). An advertisement was posted on the relevant website and announcements were made 
during some of the lectures. Students were asked to volunteer for the study by signing up on 
the website which directed them to sign up for specific study time slots.  
 
MATERIALS 
The piloting process (Chapter 3) resulted in the selection of two experimental stimuli 
(the blog and cartoon strip) and the development of several scales. These materials were 
combined into a questionnaire titled “Thoughts on Malema questionnaire” (TMQ) and two 
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versions of this questionnaire were created; one for the increased threat group and the other 
for the reduced threat group. Both of these contained:  
1. the self-categorisation prime;  
2. the biography on Julius Malema;  
3. a threat stimulus (blog or cartoon) - the IV;  
4. the racial threat scale;  
5. the intergroup emotion scale;  
6. the outgroup appraisal scale;  
7. the political intolerance scale; and  
8. the racial identification scale.  
 
The two versions of the TMQ were highly similar with the exception of a few 
features. Apart from the threat stimuli (blog vs. cartoon) being different, the biographies on 
Julius Malema were also slightly different. The one in the increased threat TMQ emphasised 
the fact that Malema is powerful and influential throughout South Africa and should therefore 
be taken seriously. The biography in the reduced threat TMQ also portrayed Malema as 
powerful; however, it claimed that the extent of his power and influence was limited. It also 
brought out the fact that Malema is not above reprimand or discipline. Thus, the biography in 
the increased threat TMQ was written to sound more threatening while the one in the reduced 
threat TMQ was written to sound less threatening. In addition, filler items were added to the 
racial threat measure in the reduced threat TMQ but not to the increased threat one. (See 
Appendix A for both versions of the TMQ).      
 
PROCEDURE 
Data for the main study was collected over a period of three weeks in February 2011. 
Participants signed up for specific half hour time slots. Before the participants arrived for the 
study, the two versions of the TMQ were arranged in random order. An online randomization 
tool known as research randomizer was used for this purpose (Research randomizer, 1997). 
The research randomizer was used to generate 10 sets of random numbers. Each set had only 
two numbers in it  1 and 2  in random order (See Table 6).  
  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
49 
 
Table 6 
Order of Random Numbers  
Set number Number order Set number Number order 
1 2, 1 6 2, 1 
2 1, 2 7 1, 2 
3 2, 1 8 2, 1 
4 1, 2 9 1, 2 
5 2, 1 10 1, 2 
 
 
These different sets were compiled into one list of twenty numbers (beginning with the first 
set) as follows: 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2. The number „1‟ was 
allocated to the blog TMQ and the number „2‟ was allocated to the cartoon TMQ. The 
questionnaires were then arranged in groups of twenty in the same order as the random list of 
numbers. For example, the first four questionnaires were in the following order: cartoon 
TMQ, blog TMQ, blog TMQ, and cartoon TMQ, which was according to the first four 
numbers of the list (2, 1, 1, and 2). When participants arrived for the study, they were given 
the questionnaires in this order. Thus the random order of the questionnaires ensured that the 
participants were randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions.  
Before the participants began the study, they were given informed consent forms to 
read and sign. This form explained the general purpose of the study. It also informed them 
that they were free to terminate the study at any point and assured them of confidentiality (see 
Appendix C for the informed consent form). Not all the details of the study were divulged at 
this point as this could have potentially affected the validity of the results as a result of social 
desirability bias (De Vaus, 2002). 
The questionnaires contained standardised instructions guiding the participants 
through each section. On completion of the TMQ, participants handed them in and were free 
to leave at their leisure. Thus the response rate was 100%. After this, they were emailed a 
debriefing form explaining the purpose, aims and theory surrounding the study in detail (see 
Appendix C for the debriefing form).Once data collection was complete, the data was coded 
and entered into STATISTICA in preparation for analysis. 
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DATA ANALYSIS METHODS USED IN THE MAIN STUDY 
Although all the preliminary scales were refined in the pilot phase, they were refined 
further using the main study data. Principal axis factor analysis (with varimax normalized 
rotation) and inter-item reliability analysis were employed for this purpose and ensured that 
the scales were of high internal consistency. These results are presented in Chapter 5.  
Independent groups t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests were used to determine 
whether there were significant differences between the increased threat and reduced threat 
groups with regards to the study variables. They were selected because they are some of the 
most powerful methods to use for this purpose. T-tests were used for normal data while Mann 
Whitney-U tests were used for non-normal data (Miles & Banyard, 2007).  
Simple regression and multiple regression were used to explore the relationships 
between the various variables in the main study. They provided both the strength and 
direction of the relationships between these variables and also clarified how much of the 
variance in the dependent variables could be attributed to the independent variables. These 
methods also allowed for a model predicting intolerance to be developed (Tredoux, 2002).   
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Different measures were put in place to ensure that this study was conducted in an ethical 
manner and that participants faced minimal risk (De Vaus, 2002). The UCT code for research 
with human subjects was adhered to. Thus, as mentioned earlier, informed consent forms 
were used to ensure that participation was voluntary. In addition, participants were allowed to 
ask questions in the process of and after they completed the questionnaire. The use of a 
debriefing form also ensured that they were fully informed about the study and that they 
remained with their dignity intact after the study (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). 
Overall, this study was of minimal risk to the participants. It was a study “in which the 
likelihood and extent of harm to the subjects is perceived to be no greater than that typically 
experienced in everyday life” (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008, p.68). Although the study 
employed stimuli to elicit racial threat in the participants, it is unlikely that these will have 
serious or lasting negative effects on them. The stimuli were sourced from various mediums 
in the public domain such as the internet, newspapers and books and were therefore not 
foreign or new to them. Furthermore, in signing the informed consent forms, the participants 
were made aware of the fact that they could terminate the study at any moment they chose. 
Thus if they felt uncomfortable or distressed they were free to leave. Unsurprisingly, none of 
them did.  
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SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an overview of the main study method. Firstly, it outlined the design 
of the study, followed by a description of the participants and sampling strategy employed. 
After this, a synopsis of the materials used for data collection was provided, followed by a 
description of the procedure and data analysis methods employed. Finally this chapter 
clarified the fact that high ethical standards were adhered to during this study. The next 
chapter presents the results of the main study data analysis.   
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
Statistical analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses of this study. This chapter 
presents the results of these analyses. However, before this is done, the data coding process 
will be outlined, followed by a synopsis of the data cleaning and entry process. After this, the 
results of the main study scale refinement process will be presented, followed by the results 
of the group comparison tests. These will be presented in an effort to show that perceived 
racial threat precipitated negative emotion and political intolerance in this study. Finally, the 
results of the linear regression analyses will be discussed with the aim of describing how the 
different study variables interact and lead to the development of political intolerance. The 
hypotheses of the study were as follows: 
1.  Perceived racial threat is positively associated with the negative intergroup emotions 
of hate, anger and fear. 
2. Perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance. 
3. Negative intergroup emotion is positively related to political intolerance. 
4. Negative intergroup emotion mediates the relationship between perceived racial threat 
and political intolerance. 
5. The kind of outgroup appraisal made will influence the kind of intergroup emotion 
expressed. When the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, participants 
will experience more fear than anger and hate. However, when the outgroup is 
appraised as weaker than the ingroup, participants will experience more hate and 
anger than fear.  
6. The strength of ingroup (racial) identification will influence the level of threat 
experienced by the participants and thus influence the intensity of intergroup 
emotions experienced and the amount of political intolerance expressed by them. 
 
DATA CODING 
After data collection was complete, two unused questionnaires (blog and cartoon 
TMQs) were used as codebooks. Specific codes were allocated to each response of each item 
in these questionnaires. These were then used to code the participants‟ questionnaires 
appropriately.  
All the measures (with the exception of outgroup appraisal), were 7 point Likert 
scales with a minimum score of „1‟ and a maximum score of „7‟. One indicated low levels of 
the relevant variables, while seven indicated high levels of the same. For example, a score of 
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one on any item in the racial threat measure indicated low perceived racial threat with regards 
to this specific item. In contrast, a score of seven revealed high levels of the same.  
The negatively worded items were reverse coded so that their scores would be in line 
with those of the positively worded ones. Following this, the data was entered into 
MICROSOFT EXCEL 2007 and STATISTICA and the scales were refined using the same 
methods employed in the pilot studies. Scales scores were then generated by summing up 
participants‟ item scores. For instance, the political intolerance scale scores were obtained by 
summing each participant‟s intolerance item scores.  
The outgroup appraisal scale was coded differently to the rest as it was a categorical 
scale. Participants were asked a set of five questions which gauged the participants‟ 
perceptions of which group was more powerful  Malema‟s faction in the ANCYL or their 
preferred political group. Thus, there were only two response options for each item and 
participants were required to select one. One response, my preferred political group, was 
given the code „0‟, while the other response, Malema’s faction in the ANCYL, was given the 
code „1‟. Hence participants were either given a score of 0 or 1 for each item, depending on 
which response they selected. Scale scores were obtained by summing up the five item 
scores. The minimum scale score was „0‟ while the maximum was „5‟. Scale scores between 
zero and two indicated that the participants appraised their preferred political group as 
stronger than outgroup and scores between three and five indicated that they perceived the 
outgroup as stronger. After the data was coded, the data cleaning process commenced. 
 
DATA CLEANING PROCESS 
All the questionnaires collected during the study were reviewed with the aim of 
identifying and removing the unusable ones from the final data pool. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Black participants, non-South Africans and strong supporters of Malema 
were excluded from the final data pool. (Strong supporters were those who scored „5‟ and 
above on the support gauge item). In addition, questionnaires of participants in the reduced 
threat group, who did not find the cartoon strip funny, were also excluded. Finally 
questionnaires of participants with large amounts of missing data (for instance whole scales 
missing), were deemed unusable. Those which had small amounts of missing data (fewer 
than three items missing) were not removed from the data pool. Instead, values were imputed 
for the missing items as the missing data was classified as missing completely at random 
(MCAR). This is because the probability of it missing seemed unrelated to the values of any 
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of the other variables in this study. Data is MCAR when “the probability that an observation 
(Xi) is missing is unrelated to the value of Xi or to the value of any other variables” (Howell, 
2009, p.2). Data imputation was the method of choice because it prevented more 
questionnaires from being excluded from the final data pool which would have reduced the 
power of the study (De Vaus, 2002).  
There are various techniques that statisticians use to impute values for missing items. 
Some of these are mean substitution, hot deck imputation, regression substitution, maximum 
likelihood method, approximate Bayesian bootstrap method, and multiple imputation 
(Howell, 2009; Shadish et al., 2002). Although mean substitution is not necessarily the best 
technique to use, it was employed in this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, many authors 
who are not in favour of using mean substitution say this with reference to the sample mean. 
It is true that using the sample mean to fill in missing values may lead to a reduction in 
variance and an underestimation of standard error (Howell, 2009). Howell (p. 16) contends 
that this method “adds no new information [as] the overall mean, with or without replacing 
missing data, will be the same.” However, in this study the sample mean was not used to 
impute missing values. Instead, the missing values were replaced by participants‟ mean scale 
scores (the average of the rest of the items that were part of the same scale as the missing 
item). This therefore had less of an effect on the variance within the sample and also, to a 
certain extent, added new information to the data pool as it still captured the variance that 
each individual added to the sample.  
More importantly, each individual with missing data only had one item missing in 
their questionnaire. Thus out of a large number of items, data was only imputed for one item, 
for each participant with missing data. It is unlikely that this would greatly alter their results. 
According to Shadish and his colleagues (2002, p. 339), “when both total and differential 
attrition are low (less than 10%) and the effect size is high, these [attrition] analyses will 
rarely change the qualitative conclusion about whether a treatment works compared with 
analyses that do not take attrition into account.”  The attrition in this study was very low (less 
than 10%) as is shown below.    
 Increased threat group: 5 participants out of 68 (7.35%) had one missing item. 
 Reduced threat group: 1 participant out of 55 (1.81%) had one missing item. 
 In total, only 6 participants out of a sample of 123 had missing data (1 item per 
participant), which was only 4.88% of the sample. 
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Thus, it was concluded that using the participants‟ mean scale scores to fill in missing data 
would not greatly alter the results of the group as whole. After the data was cleaned, the main 
study scale refinement process began. 
 
MAIN STUDY SCALE REFINEMENT RESULTS 
The results of the refinement process indicated yet again that all the scales had high 
internal consistency.  
 
Perceived Racial Threat Scale Refinement Results 
Inter-item reliability analysis on the racial threat measure (C1-C7) revealed that the 
scale had high internal consistency. Cronbach‟s alpha was .79, all the items had item-total 
correlations above .4 and most of the inter-item correlations were above .3 (see Table 7). 
Principal axis factor analysis indicated that a one factor solution was the most 
comprehensible. This factor was the only one with an eigen value higher than one (2.64) and 
accounted for 37.69% of the variance in items. In addition, all the items loaded above .45 
onto it and the communalities for all the items (with the exception of two) were above .35 
(see Appendix D for communalities). Both analyses did not flag any items as weak, thus all 
seven items were kept as part of the final scale. The means of all the items indicated that 
threat amongst the participants was quite high. On a scale of 1-7, all the items had a mean of 
above 5 (see Table 7).    
 
Table 7 
Racial Threat Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses      
Item Mean SD Reliability Single- 
factor 
loading 
Rotated loadings 
from two-factor 
solution 
Item-total 
correlation 
Alpha if 
deleted 
1 2 
C1 6.39 0.90 .51 .77 .59 .23 .73 
C2
 
5.79 1.33 .61 .74 .69 .67 .27 
C3
 
6.18 1.02 .55 .76 .64 .30 .69 
C4
 
5.99 1.12 .59 .75 .66 .75 .16 
C5 6.29 0.95 .61 .75 .69 .57 .39 
C6 5.87 1.12 .40 .78 .46 .43 .19 
C7
 
5.02 1.55 .45 .79 .51 .43 .27 
Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface. 
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Intergroup Emotion Scale Refinement Results 
Factor analysis on the intergroup emotion scale yielded similar results to the pilot studies. 
That is, the anger and hate items loaded onto one factor, indicating that they were tapping 
into the same underlying construct. In addition, the fear and happiness items loaded onto 
separate factors. The anger/ hate factor had an eigen value of 5.53 and accounted for 36.84% 
of the variance in items. The fear factor had an eigen value of 1.13 and accounted for 7.51% 
of the variance, while the happiness factor had an eigen value of 0.67 and accounted for 
4.46% of the variance in items. Although the happiness factor had an eigen value lower than 
one, it was kept as a separate factor because a three-factor solution was more comprehensible 
than a two-factor one. When two factors were extracted, the happiness items loaded onto the 
same factor as the anger and hate items (see Table 8). Furthermore, the communalities of a 
two-factor solution and a three-factor solution indicated that the three-factor solution was a 
better fit to the data (see Appendix D). The item “uneasy” loaded above .3 onto two factors. 
However, it loaded more highly onto the second factor with the other fear items (anxious, 
worried and afraid) and was therefore kept as part of this factor (see Table 8). In light of this, 
the anger and hate items were combined into one sub-scale (the anger sub-scale), while 
happiness and fear remained as separate sub-scales.  
 
Table 8 
Factor loadings for Intergroup Emotion Scale 
Item Rotated loadings from three-factor 
solution 
 Rotated loadings 
from two-factor 
solution 
1 2 3 1 2 
Anxious .22 .69 .08  .20 .71 
Irritated .52 .24 .14  .53 .26 
Hostile .61 .24 .06  .59 .25 
Happy -.28 -.05 -.44  -.39 .-09 
Worried .20 .83 .12  .21 .83 
Furious .83 .26 .19  .83 .28 
Disgusted .61 .13 .14  .62 .14 
Proud -.14 -.07 -.39  -.26 -.11 
Uneasy .37 .50 .24  .41 .52 
Outraged .75 .22 .21  .77 .24 
Hateful .78 .19 .20  .79 .22 
Afraid .14 .59 .04  .13 .59 
Angry .73 .18 .27  .78 .20 
Joyful -.04 -.09 -.67  -.24 -.15 
Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface. 
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Inter-item reliability analysis on the separate emotion sub-scales indicated that the anger 
and fear sub-scales were of high internal consistency. Anger had a Cronbach‟s alpha of .89, 
and fear had a Cronbach‟s alpha of .79. The item-total correlations for the anger items were 
quite high, ranging from .56 to .83. Thus all the items in this sub-scale seemed to be highly 
related to each other. This analysis supported the results of the Factor analysis in that it 
indicated that the anger and hate items should be combined in one scale. The fear items all 
had item-total correlations above .3. In addition, the analysis revealed that if any of these 
items were removed from the fear sub-scale, the Cronbach‟s alpha would decrease (see Table 
9). This suggested that all the items should be retained in the final fear sub-scale.    
  The happiness sub-scale did not have high internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha = .47) 
indicating that it may not be a very reliable scale and should therefore be used with caution in 
the investigation of the hypotheses.   
 
Table 9 
Emotion Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability Analysis 
Sub-scale Item Mean SD Reliability 
 Item-total 
correlation 
Alpha if 
deleted 
Anger Angry 4.83 1.52 .76 .87 
Irritated 5.89 1.28 .56 .89 
Hostile 4.37 1.66 .61 .89 
Furious 4.55 1.78 .83 .86 
Disgusted 5.47 1.64 .61 .89 
Outraged 4.90 1.54 .76 .87 
Hateful 3.50 1.69 .78 .87 
      
Fear Anxious 4.76 1.49 .61 .73 
Worried 5.36 1.39 .75 .66 
Uneasy 5.22 1.36 .52 .77 
Afraid 4.43 1.54 .52 .78 
      
Happiness Happy 1.62 0.93 .30 .48 
Proud 1.19 0.47 .29 .41 
Joyful 1.30 0.59 .37 .27 
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Political Intolerance Scale Refinement Results 
Inter-item reliability analysis on the political intolerance items (F1-F15) indicated that 
the scale had high internal consistency with a Cronbach‟s alpha of .85. All the items, except 
F10 and F12, had item-total correlations above .3. In addition, if any items were deleted from 
the scale (with the exception of F10 and F12) this would result in a decrease in the alpha of 
the scale (see Table 10).  
 Principal axis factor analysis indicated that a one factor solution was most 
comprehensible. This factor had an eigen value of 4.73 and accounted for 31.53 % of the 
variance in items. It was the only factor with an eigen value greater than one. In addition, this 
solution resulted in fewer cross-loadings than a two factor solution (see Table 10). This 
analysis revealed a strong relatedness between the items, as they all (with the exception of 
F10 and F12) loaded above .3 onto this factor. Most of the communalities were moderate 
(above .3) indicating that the items were sharing some variance. Items F10 and F12 had very 
low communalities (below .1) indicating that they did not have much in common with the 
other variables (see Appendix D for communalities). Item F15 also had a low communality 
(.2) and its loading was markedly lower than loadings of the other items (see Table 10).  
  Therefore both analyses indicated that the political intolerance scale had three weak 
items. Two of these items  F10 and F12 were very weak while the third (F15) was 
moderately weak. F10 and F12 had extremely low item-total correlations and did not load 
onto any factor (see Table 10). They were also the same items that had been identified as 
weak during the pilot scale refinement process. That is, items that tapped into aggressive 
political intolerance. In light of this, items F10 and F12 were removed from the scale. The 
moderately weak item (F15) had an acceptable item to scale correlation (above .3) and loaded 
moderately onto the political intolerance factor (see Table 10). However, when compared to 
the rest of the items in the scale, this item was weaker. The other items had higher item to 
scale correlations and loaded more highly onto the political tolerance factor. The inter-item 
reliability analysis also indicated that if this item was deleted from the scale, the Cronbach‟s 
alpha would not change. This therefore suggested that item F15 did not add much to the 
political intolerance scale. For this reason, it was also removed from the scale, resulting in a 
final scale of high internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha= .87), with 12 items. 
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Table 10 
Political Intolerance Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses      
Item Mean SD Reliability Single 
factor 
loading 
Rotated loadings 
from two-factor 
solution 
Item-total 
correlation 
Alpha if 
deleted 
 1 2 
F1
 
5.28 1.93 .58 .83 .61 .60 .12 
F2
 
5.59 1.83 .57 .83 .63 .58 .23 
F3
 
5.65 1.39 .59 .83 .64 .60 .20 
F4 4.17 1.94 .69 .83 .72 .81 -.16 
F5
 
4.85 1.61 .40 .84 .44 .42 .09 
F6
 
5.00 1.82 .61 .83 .64 .66 .03 
F7 4.08 1.84 .62 .83 .69 .74 -.07 
F8 3.95 1.86 .62 .83 .68 .74 -.08 
F9
 
5.92 1.69 .53 .84 .58 .49 .39 
F10
a 
4.66 1.53 .002 .86 .00 .01 -.05 
F11
 
5.09 1.49 .52 .84 .59 .57 .15 
F12
a 
2.48 1.35 -.02 .86 .02 .01 -.10 
F13 5.28 1.47 .49 .84 .53 .41 .63 
F14
 
5.88 1.42 .56 .84 .61 .49 .63 
F15
a 
4.37 1.78 .34 .85 .37 .33 .20 
Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface. 
a 
Item not selected for final twelve-item scale. 
 
Racial Identification Scale Refinement Results 
Inter-item reliability analysis on the racial identification items (G1-G8) revealed that the 
scale had high internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha of .82). All the items, with the 
exception of G1, had item- total correlations above .3. In addition, if any item, with the 
exception of G1, was deleted, it would result in a drop in the Cronbach‟s alpha of the scale 
(see Table 11).  
Principal axis factor analysis indicated that there was one dominant factor with an eigen 
value higher than 1. This factor accounted for 39.04% of the variance and all the items (with 
the exception of G1) loaded above .38 onto it. In addition, most of the communalities were 
above .38 suggesting a strong relatedness between all the items (see Appendix D). Both 
analyses flagged item G1 as a weak item. In light of this, it was removed from the scale 
resulting in a final scale of seven items with high internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha= 
.83). 
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Table 11 
Racial Identification Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses      
Item Mean SD Reliability Single- 
factor 
loading 
Rotated loadings 
from two-factor 
solution 
Item-total 
correlation 
Alpha if 
deleted 
1 2 
G1
a 
5.11 1.30 .26 .83 .27 .08 .42 
G2
 
5.09 1.48 .37 .82 .39 .16 .53 
G3
 
4.67 1.65 .58 .79 .64 .52 .38 
G4 5.28 1.53 .70 .78 .79 .67 .41 
G5 4.42 1.66 .70 .78 .79 .63 .48 
G6 5.63 1.36 .49 .81 .56 .59 .12 
G7 4.43 1.59 .65 .79 .72 .72 .21 
G8 3.97 1.69 .57 .79 .64 .68 .12 
Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface. 
a 
Item not selected for final seven-item scale.  
 
Table 12 presents a summary of the psychometric properties of the preliminary and 
refined scales 
 
Table 12 
Psychometric Properties of the Final Scales  
Scale Cronbach‟s alphas Average 
inter-item 
correlation 
of refined 
scales 
Number of 
preliminary 
items 
Number 
of items in 
the final 
scales 
Preliminary 
scales 
Refined scales 
1. Perceived racial 
threat 
.79 .79 .37 7 7 
2. Intergroup emotion 
 
.84 .84 
*
.19 14 14 
 Fear .79 .79 .49 4 4 
 Anger .89 .89 .56 4 7 
 Happiness .47 .47 .27 3 3 
3. Political 
intolerance 
.84 .87 .36 15 12 
4. Racial 
identification 
.82 .83 .37 8 7 
*The average inter-item correlation for the intergroup emotion scale was low due to the fact that this scale was 
composed of four subscales tapping into different kinds of emotion.  
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GROUP COMPARISON TESTS RESULTS 
The purpose of the group comparison tests was to investigate whether there were 
significant differences between the increased threat (blog) group and the reduced threat 
(cartoon) group with regard to the independent and dependent variables of the study: 
perceived racial threat, intergroup emotion, outgroup appraisal, racial identification, and 
political intolerance. Mann-Whitney U tests were used for non-normal data while t-tests were 
used for normally distributed data (Miles & Banyard, 2007).  
As will be seen below, the results of the group comparison tests indicated that there 
were significant differences between the two groups with regard to perceived racial threat, 
negative emotion and political intolerance. The increased threat group had significantly 
higher levels of racial threat, negative intergroup emotion (anger and fear) and political 
intolerance than the reduced threat group. The tests also revealed that there were no 
significant differences between the two groups regarding outgroup appraisal and strength of 
racial identification. 
 
Perceived Racial Threat 
Statistical analyses indicated that the racial threat data was negatively skewed in the 
increased threat group but normally distributed in the reduced threat group (See Figure 1). 
This suggested that the increased threat stimulus (i.e. the blog) was effective, as it seemed to 
push all the blog group participants‟ levels of threat towards the higher end of the scale. T-
tests require that data in each group should be normally distributed. However, as the data in 
one of the groups was skewed, a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to evaluate the 
hypothesis that the blog group participants would on average experience higher levels of 
threat than the cartoon group participants. 
The Mann-Whitney U test does not compare the means of groups as the t-test does, 
instead, it compares the average ranks of groups. To obtain the average rank, all the scale 
scores are ordered from the minimum to the maximum score. These scores are then assigned 
specific ranks in ascending order. For example, if the minimum score is 5, it is given the rank 
„1‟ and if the next score is 6, it is given the rank „2‟ and so on. Once this is done, the ranks of 
the scores in the separate groups are summed and divided by the number of participants in the 
group (Miles & Banyard, 2007).              
The results of the test were in the expected direction and significant. The blog group 
(average rank = 74.93) experienced significantly more threat than the cartoon group (average 
rank= 46.01), U= 990.5, z = 4.47, p < .01.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of racial threat scores in the blog and cartoon groups. 
 
Intergroup Emotion  
Anger 
The anger data was normally distributed in both experimental groups (see Figure 2). 
Therefore, a t-test was conducted to evaluate whether the blog group experienced more anger 
than the cartoon group. Levene‟s test for homogeneity of variance was not significant, 
F(1,121) = 1.35, p = .50. Therefore, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was upheld. 
A one tailed t-test indicated that the blog group experienced significantly more anger (M = 
36.75, SD = 7.46) than the cartoon group (M = 29.50, SD = 8.66), t (121) = 4.98, p <.01, 
d=.91.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of anger scores in the blog and cartoon groups. 
N
o
 o
f 
o
b
s
e
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
group: blog
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
group: cartoon
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
N
o
 o
f 
o
b
s
e
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
group: blog
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
group: cartoon
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
63 
 
Fear 
The distribution graphs indicated that the data within each group was normally 
distributed (see Figure 3). Therefore, a t-test was conducted to investigate whether there was 
a significant difference between the fear levels of the blog and cartoon groups. It was 
hypothesised that the blog participants would experience more fear than the cartoon 
participants. Levene‟s statistic was not significant, F (1, 121) = 1.03, p = .75, thus the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was upheld. The results indicated that the blog group 
expressed significantly more fear (M= 21.19, SD = 4.28) than the cartoon group (M =18, SD= 
4.22), t (121) = 4.14, p < .01, d = .75.  
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of fear scores in the blog and cartoon groups. 
 
Happiness 
The data for both groups was positively skewed (see Figure 4). Therefore, a Mann-
Whitney U test was conducted to determine whether the blog group participants would, on 
average, experience less happiness than the cartoon group participants. The results indicated 
that the blog group (average rank = 51.49) expressed significantly less happiness than the 
cartoon group (average rank = 75), U=1155, z = -3.63, p < .01.  
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Figure 4. Distribution of happiness scores in the blog and cartoon groups. 
 
Outgroup Appraisal 
The outgroup appraisal data was highly skewed (see Figure 5). This indicated that 
participants in both groups generally viewed the outgroup (Malema‟s faction in the ANC 
Youth League) as stronger than their preferred political group.      
 A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that there was no significant difference between the 
blog group (average rank = 62.31) and the cartoon group (average rank = 61.62) with regard 
to outgroup appraisal, U = 1849, z = 0.11, p =.92.   
 
 
 
 Figure 5. Distribution of outgroup appraisal scores in the blog and cartoon groups. 
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Racial (Ethnic) Identification 
The racial identification data was normally distributed in each group (see Figure 6). 
Therefore, a two-tailed t-test was conducted to investigate whether there was a difference 
between the blog and cartoon groups in terms of racial identification. Levene‟s test for 
homogeneity of variance was not significant, F (1, 121) = 1.07, p = .94, indicating that the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was upheld. The results showed that the blog group‟s 
average level of racial identification (M = 33.41, SD =7.93) was highly similar to that of the 
cartoon group (M = 33.62, SD = 7.67). There was no significant difference between the two 
groups, t (121) = 0.15, p < .88.  
 
 
  Figure 6. Distribution of racial identification scores in the blog and cartoon groups. 
 
Political Intolerance 
The intolerance data was normally distributed within both groups (See Figure 7). 
Therefore, a one-tailed t-test was conducted to evaluate whether the blog group expressed 
higher levels of intolerance than the cartoon group. The assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was upheld as Levene‟s statistic was not found to be significant, F (1, 121) = 0.06, p 
= .81. The test revealed that the blog group expressed significantly more intolerance (M = 
62.60, SD = 13.71) than the cartoon group (M = 58.43, SD = 12.57), t (121) = 1.74, p = .04, 
d= .32.  
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  Figure 7. Distribution of political intolerance scores in the blog and cartoon groups. 
 
Group Comparison Summary  
The results of the group comparison tests unequivocally support most of the 
hypotheses of the study. The group that experienced significantly more racial threat (blog 
group), also expressed much more anger and fear and less happiness than the group that 
experienced less racial threat (cartoon group). Furthermore, this increased threat group also 
expressed significantly more political intolerance towards the outgroup than the reduced 
threat group.  
Racial identification and outgroup appraisal did not seem to influence the levels of 
political intolerance in the groups as both groups had similar levels of the two variables. Both 
groups appraised Malema and his supporters as stronger than their political ingroup.     
The group comparison analyses therefore suggest that perceived racial threat may 
indeed precipitate negative emotion (anger and fear) and political intolerance. Table 13 
provides a summary of the group comparison results. 
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Table 13 
Summary Results of Group Comparison Tests 
Variable U 
statistic 
Average rank   t value Mean  
 
p 
blog 
group 
cartoon 
group 
blog 
group 
cartoon 
group 
1. Racial threat 990.50 74.93 46.01    .001 
2. Anger    4.98 36.75 29.50 .001 
3. Fear    4.14 21.19 18 .001 
4. Happiness 1155 51.49 75    .001 
5. Outgroup 
appraisal 
1849 62.31 61.62    .92 
6. Racial 
identification 
   0.15 33.41 33.62 .88 
7. Political 
intolerance 
   1.74 62.60 58.43 .04 
 
LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL 
PREDICTING POLITICAL INTOLERANCE 
Intergroup emotions theory suggests that apart from the main variables (intergroup 
threat and intergroup emotion), outgroup appraisal and ingroup identification also have a role 
to play in the action tendencies adopted by individuals. In order to investigate how these 
different variables may interact in the development of political intolerance, a preliminary 
model predicting political intolerance was formulated using IET (see Figure 8). Linear 
regression analyses were then conducted to test this model, as well as to further investigate 
the hypotheses of the study. The results of these analyses are presented in this section.   
  
 
   
           
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Preliminary Model Predicting Political Intolerance 
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Hypothesis 1: Perceived racial threat is positively associated with the negative 
intergroup emotions of hate, anger and fear  
During scale refinement, the anger and hate emotion items loaded highly onto the 
same factor and were therefore combined into one sub-scale, namely the anger scale. The 
group comparison tests done earlier supported the first hypothesis, as they found that racial 
threat was positively associated with negative intergroup emotion. To further investigate this 
hypothesis, simple regression analyses with racial threat as the independent variable and the 
intergroup emotions as the dependent variables were conducted on the whole sample.  
The analyses revealed that racial threat had a significant positive association with the 
negative intergroup emotions. As racial threat increased amongst the participants, anger and 
fear also increased, while happiness decreased. Thus, the statistical analyses supported the 
hypothesis that perceived racial threat is positively associated with negative intergroup 
emotion. The regression results indicated that racial threat accounted for 10% of the variance 
in anger, 9% of the variance in fear and 26% of the variance in happiness (see Table 14).   
 
Table 14 
Racial Threat and Intergroup Emotion Regression Results 
Intergroup 
emotion 
M SD  t value R
2 
F (1, 121) p< 
Anger 33.51 8.77 .32 3.66 .10 13.41 .001 
Fear 19.76 4.52 .29 3.41 .09 11.64 .001 
Happiness 4.11 1.44 -.51 -6.45 .26 41.56 .001 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance 
The group comparison test results presented earlier supported this second hypothesis 
as the participants in the increased threat group expressed significantly more political 
intolerance than those in the reduced threat group. To test this hypothesis further, a simple 
regression analysis was conducted with racial threat as the predictor variable and political 
intolerance as the outcome variable. Racial threat was found to be a significant predictor of 
political intolerance in this sample,  = .23, t (122)= 2.61, p =.01. It also accounted for 5.3% 
of the variance in political intolerance, R
2
 = .05, F (1, 121) = 6.83, p = .01. 
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Hypothesis 3: Negative intergroup emotion is positively related to political intolerance        
As mentioned earlier, group comparison tests found that the increased threat group expressed 
significantly more negative emotion (anger and fear) than the reduced threat group. This 
same group also expressed significantly more political intolerance than the reduced threat 
group. Thus the group that experienced more negative intergroup emotion also expressed 
significantly more political intolerance. These tests therefore suggested that the negative 
intergroup emotions were likely to be positively associated with political intolerance in the 
whole sample. To investigate this, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with anger, 
fear and happiness as the predictor variables and political intolerance as the outcome variable. 
 
Multiple regression analysis 
All the variables (anger, fear, political intolerance) with the exception of happiness were 
found to be normally distributed. Although happiness was positively skewed, the distribution 
of the residuals was found to be generally normal with only one outlier. This outlier was less 
than 1% of the total number of cases included in the regression analysis and was therefore not 
excluded (Tredoux, 2002). The relationships between all the emotions and political 
intolerance were linear. Thus the assumptions for multiple regression were upheld.  
The correlations in Table 15 show that anger and fear had positive correlations with 
political intolerance while happiness had a negative correlation with political intolerance. 
Anger and fear, as well as anger and happiness were moderately related. This indicated that 
multicollinearity (of the independent variables) was possibly an issue to take into account for 
this regression.     
  
Table 15 
Correlations between the Intergroup Emotions and Political Intolerance 
Variable Anger Fear Happiness Political 
intolerance 
Anger  .52
*** 
-.39
*** 
.25
** 
Fear   -.25
** 
.25
** 
Happiness    -.25
** 
     
*
p < 0.05, 
** 
p
 
< 0.01, 
***
 p
 
< 0.001 
 
The regression analysis revealed that the intergroup emotions significantly predicted political 
intolerance, R
2 
= .11, F (3, 119) = 4.66, p < 0.01 and accounted for approximately 11% of the 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
70 
 
variance in this variable. However, the coefficients of each emotion were not significant (see 
Table 16). This suggested that the emotions were sharing a large amount of variance and so 
when they were put into the regression together, they stopped being significant predictors on 
their own.  
 The partial correlations also indicated that the different emotions shared a fair amount 
of variance. Fear and anger had zero-order correlations of .25 with political intolerance, while 
happiness had a zero-order correlation of -.25 with the same variable. However, the partial 
correlation values were smaller. For example, anger had a partial correlation of .09 indicating 
that it was sharing quite a bit of variance with fear and happiness. Happiness seemed to be the 
variable that shared least variance with the other two variables as it had the largest partial 
correlation with political intolerance (-.16) and also had the largest tolerance value (.84). 
Anger on the other hand, seemed to be the variable least tolerant to the influence of the other 
independent variables (tolerance= .66) (see table 16). The zero-order inter-correlations seen 
earlier also indicated that anger was quite highly related to fear (r =.52) and moderately to 
happiness (r = -.39).  
 
Table 16 
Coefficients and Correlations of the Intergroup Emotions 
Emotion b Std 
error 
Beta t value p Zero order 
correlation 
Partial 
correlation 
Tolerance 
Anger 0.162 .16 .11 0.99 .32 .25 .09 .66 
Fear 0.450 .29 .15 1.51 .14 .25 .14 .73 
Happiness -1.528 .87 -.17 -1.75 .08 -.25 -.16 .84 
 
 
Previous empirical research revealed that this overlap between anger and fear was not 
unique to this study. This literature suggests that negative emotions like anger and fear are 
not always distinct from each other (Brader, Valentino & Suhay, 2008). In light of this and 
the problems arising from multicollinearity, anger and fear were combined into one new 
variable, namely „negative intergroup emotion‟. Multiple regression was then conducted on 
political intolerance with negative intergroup emotion and happiness as the independent 
variables. 
The distribution of the residuals was generally normal with two outliers which 
accounted for less than 2% of the total number of cases included in the regression analysis. 
They were therefore not excluded (Tredoux, 2002). The relationships between all the 
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independent variables and political intolerance were linear. Thus the assumptions for multiple 
regression were upheld.  
The overall model was found to be significant, R
2
 = .10, F (2, 120) = 6.99, p = .001, 
and accounted for approximately 10% of the variance in political intolerance. Thus the 
amount of variance accounted for by this new model (negative intergroup emotion and 
happiness) was quite similar to the previous model. The tolerance of each variable also 
increased to .86. The coefficient of negative intergroup emotion was found to be significant, 
however the coefficient of happiness was not found to be significant (see Table 17). 
 
Table 17 
Coefficients and Correlations of negative intergroup emotion and happiness 
Emotion b Std 
error 
Beta t value p Zero order 
correlation 
Partial 
correlation 
Tolerance 
Negative 
emotion 
1.018 .42 .23 2.44 .02 .29 .22 .86 
Happiness -1.486 .85 -.16 -1.73 .09 -.25 -.16 .86 
 
Consequently, happiness was removed from the model and a simple regression was 
conducted on political intolerance with negative intergroup emotion as the predictor variable. 
This variable was found to be a significant predictor, R= .29, R
2
= .08, F (1, 121) = 10.81, 
p=0.001 and accounted for 8.2% of the variance in political intolerance. Therefore, the 
regression analyses supported hypothesis three as they indicated that negative intergroup 
emotion was positively related to political intolerance.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Negative intergroup emotion mediates the relationship between perceived 
racial threat and political intolerance         
The regression analyses presented so far revealed that perceived racial threat was a 
significant predictor of negative intergroup emotion. They also found that both racial threat 
and negative emotion were significant predictors of political intolerance. The use of threat 
stimuli in the experimental groups indicated that threat probably preceded negative 
intergroup emotion amongst the participants. Thus, it was important to investigate whether 
negative intergroup emotion mediated the relationship between perceived racial threat and 
political intolerance (see Figure 9).  
The first step of the mediation analysis was to determine whether racial threat was 
significantly related to political intolerance. This was confirmed in the investigation of 
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hypothesis two, R =.23, R
2 
= .05, b = .57, F (1, 121) = 6.83, p =.01. Therefore, the next step 
of mediation analysis was done. The purpose of this step was to investigate whether racial 
threat was a significant predictor of negative intergroup emotion. A simple regression 
analysis with racial threat as the independent variable and negative intergroup emotion as the 
dependent variable was conducted, and racial threat was found to be a significant predictor of 
negative intergroup emotion, R = .35, R
2 
= .12, b = .19, F (1, 121) = 17.09, p <.01. 
Next, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with racial threat and negative 
intergroup emotion predicting political intolerance. The overall model was significant, R
2
= 
.10, F (2,120) = 6.77, p < .01. However, the slope coefficient for racial threat ceased to be 
significant when negative intergroup emotion was added into the model (b= .37, p = .11). The 
b value also reduced in size from .57 to .37. These results indicated that negative intergroup 
emotion mediated the relationship between perceived racial threat and political intolerance. A 
Sobel test confirmed this to be true, test statistic = 2.16, SE = 0.09, p = .03. Thus, these 
results supported the fourth hypothesis of this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mediation Model  
 
 
Hypothesis 5: The kind of outgroup appraisal made will influence the kind of 
intergroup emotion expressed. When the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the 
ingroup, participants will experience more fear than anger. However, when the 
outgroup is appraised as weaker than the ingroup, participants will experience more 
hate and anger than fear 
To test this hypothesis, simple regression analyses were conducted with outgroup 
appraisal as the independent variable and the different intergroup emotions fear and anger 
(including hate)  as the dependent variables.  
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The results of the analysis revealed that outgroup appraisal did not have a significant 
relationship with any of the negative intergroup emotions. Furthermore, the correlations 
between outgroup appraisal and the different emotions were all quite low indicating that there 
was almost no relationship between outgroup appraisal and the different emotions (see Table 
18).  
Outgroup appraisal had a positive relationship with anger (Table 18). However, if the 
hypothesis had proven to be true, outgroup appraisal should have had a negative relationship 
with anger. This is because empirical research (Mackie et al., 2000) suggests that if the 
outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, this leads to less anger and hate and more 
fear. Therefore, in this study it seemed that the kind of outgroup appraisal made by the 
participants did not seem to influence the kind of emotion that they expressed.   
 Although outgroup appraisal did not have a significant relationship with any of the 
negative intergroup emotions, its relationship with political intolerance approached 
significance, R= .17, R
2
= .03, F(1, 121) = 3.79, p = .054. This relationship however, was 
weak.          
 
Table 18 
Results of Outgroup appraisal regression analyses 
Variable M SD r t value  R
2
 F(1, 122) p 
Fear 19.76 4.52 .01 .12 .00 0.02  .91 
Anger 33.51 8.77 .04 -.47 .00 0.22  .64 
Political 
Intolerance 
60.74 13.33 .17 1.947 .03 3.79 .054 
 
     
Hypothesis 6: The strength of ingroup (racial) identification will influence the level of 
threat experienced by the participants and thus influence the intensity of intergroup 
emotions experienced and the amount of political intolerance expressed by them. 
Firstly, a simple regression analysis was done with racial identification as the 
predictor variable and racial threat as the outcome variable. The variables were found to be 
reasonably symmetrical and the assumption of linearity was upheld. The residuals were found 
to be normally distributed with only two outliers present in the sample.  
The relationship between strength of racial identification and perceived racial threat 
was very weak, infact almost negligible (r = .02). In addition, the regression analysis 
indicated that strength of racial identification was not a significant predictor of racial threat in 
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this sample (see Table 19). The standard deviation of racial threat (5.41) was quite close to 
the standard error of estimate (5.43), indicating that the regression equation derived from this 
analysis would not be adequate. Therefore, these results suggested that the participants‟ 
strength of racial identification did not exert a significant influence on the amount of racial 
threat that they experienced.  
In contrast, a simple regression analysis with racial identification as the independent 
variable and negative intergroup emotion as the dependent variable indicated that racial 
identification was significantly related to negative intergroup emotion. However, counter 
intuitively another simple regression analysis revealed that it was not significantly related to 
political intolerance (see Table 19).    
   
Table 19 
Results of Racial Identification Regression analyses 
 
Variable M SD  t value R
2
 F(1, 122) P 
Racial threat 41.54 5.41 .02 .24 .00 0.06 .81 
Negative 
emotion 
13.89 2.97 .29 3.29 .08 10.86  .00 
Political 
Intolerance 
60.74 13.33 .16 1.74 .02 3.03 .08 
 
Overall, these regression results offered mixed support for hypothesis 6. To begin 
with, strength of racial identification did not influence the amount of perceived racial threat 
that participants experienced. Thus, the first part of hypothesis 6 was not supported. 
Nevertheless, racial identification still influenced the quantity of negative intergroup emotion 
that participants expressed. The relationship between racial identification and negative 
intergroup emotion was positive and significant, suggesting that the more participants 
identified with their racial group, the more intensely they felt negative emotion.  Surprisingly, 
racial identification did not seem to exert much influence on political intolerance.   
Summary Regression Results 
The regression analyses revealed a number of things. Firstly, that perceived racial 
threat is a significant predictor of political intolerance and that this relationship is mediated 
by negative intergroup emotion. Secondly, that outgroup appraisal did not significantly 
influence the kind of intergroup emotion expressed and finally, that strength of racial 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
75 
 
identification did not influence the level of racial threat experienced by the participants or the 
amount of political intolerance they expressed. This led to the development of a refined 
model predicting political intolerance (see Figure 10).  
 
 
   
           
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Refined Regression Model Predicting Political Intolerance 
 
 
SUMMARY 
The findings of this study strongly suggest that perceived racial threat precipitates 
negative intergroup emotion and political intolerance in individuals. The group comparison 
results indicated that the group that perceived more threat from the outgroup, expressed 
significantly more negative emotion and political intolerance towards them, than the group 
with reduced threat levels. These results were supported by the linear regression analyses 
which found that perceived racial threat was a good predictor of negative emotion and 
political intolerance in the whole sample. In addition, these analyses revealed that negative 
intergroup emotion mediated the relationship between perceived racial threat and political 
intolerance.  
The variables outgroup appraisal and strength of racial identification did not exert an 
influence on the relationship between racial threat, negative intergroup emotion and political 
intolerance. However racial identification seemed to have some influence on negative 
intergroup emotion. The next chapter of this study presents a discussion of these findings. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis investigated whether intergroup threat (perceived racial threat) and negative 
intergroup emotion would lead to the development of political intolerance in a post-apartheid 
generation of South Africans. It also investigated whether outgroup appraisals and degree of 
ingroup (racial) identification influence the relationship between racial threat, negative 
intergroup emotion and political intolerance. The intergroup emotions theory (IET) was used 
as a framework to generate the following hypotheses: 
1. Perceived racial threat is positively associated with the negative intergroup emotions 
of hate, anger and fear. 
2. Perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance. 
3. Negative intergroup emotion is positively related to political intolerance. 
4. Negative intergroup emotion mediates the relationship between perceived racial threat 
and political intolerance. 
5. The kind of outgroup appraisal made will influence the kind of intergroup emotion 
expressed. When the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, participants 
will experience more fear than anger and hate. However, when the outgroup is 
appraised as weaker than the ingroup, participants will experience more hate and 
anger than fear.  
6. The strength of ingroup (racial) identification will influence the level of threat 
experienced by the participants and thus the intensity of intergroup emotions 
experienced by the participants and the amount of political intolerance expressed. 
 
The results unequivocally supported the first four hypotheses. To begin with, the 
experiment revealed that perceived racial threat precipitated negative emotion and political 
intolerance amongst the participants. In addition, linear regression analyses on the whole 
sample indicated that this same variable was a strong predictor of political intolerance and 
that this relationship was mediated by negative intergroup emotion. In contrast, the findings 
did not support the fifth hypothesis and offered mixed support for the sixth one. The type of 
outgroup appraisal made by participants did not influence the kind of intergroup emotion that 
they expressed. In addition, participants‟ strength of racial identification did not influence the 
amount of threat that they experienced or the amount of political intolerance they expressed. 
It however influenced the intensity of emotions that they felt. These findings illuminate 
several points which will be discussed in this chapter. To be exact: 
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1. That intergroup threat (racial threat) and negative intergroup emotion are potent 
triggers of political intolerance. 
2. That racial threat and negative emotion may be more influential than outgroup 
appraisal and racial identification in the development of intolerance. 
3. That political intolerance is not a phenomenon that is confined to less educated 
groups of people of low socio-economic status. 
4. That political intolerance in South Africa is not a feature of the past as it is still 
alive in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans. 
5. That race at present still influences people‟s political tolerance judgements in 
South Africa.  
6. That intergroup emotions theory is viable and offers a comprehensive explanation 
of how intergroup threat can lead to the development of political intolerance. 
 
RACIAL THREAT AND NEGATIVE EMOTION AS POTENT TRIGGERS OF 
INTOLERANCE 
Several empirical studies document the fact that intergroup threat is a strong predictor 
of political intolerance (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Gibson, 2006). However, a majority of these 
are correlational studies and therefore “do not provide strong evidence for causality between 
the surveyed constructs” (Halperin et al., 2009, p.117). This study is insightful in that it 
isolates the effect of perceived racial threat on negative intergroup emotion and political 
intolerance and in doing so, reveals that intergroup threat is not only a good predictor of 
intolerance, but also a potent trigger of the same. It also demonstrates that intergroup threat 
works in conjunction with negative intergroup emotion. To be precise, threat triggers 
negative emotions which in turn elicit political intolerance (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Marcus et al., 2005).  
This is consistent with the findings of Halperin, Canetti-Nisim and Hirsch-Hoefler‟s 
(2009) study which demonstrated that perceived threat amongst Israelis was associated with 
the development of political intolerance and that this relationship was fully mediated by 
hatred. When a direct path between perceived threat and intolerance was tested, it was not 
found to be significant. Thus they suggested that, “perceived threat...has only an indirect 
effect on political intolerance, through hatred” (Halperin et al., 2009, p.112). It is important to 
note that in their study, hatred, anger and fear were found to be distinct emotions with distinct 
relationships with political intolerance. Hatred had a direct relationship with it, however, 
anger and fear did not. Their relationships with intolerance were mediated by hatred. For 
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example, it was suggested that intolerance is more likely to occur when anger evolves into 
hatred. In contrast, the current study did not find anger and hate to be distinct emotions. Fear 
however was distinct. Although this goes against the findings of the aforementioned study, it 
is consistent with those of numerous other studies and is a reflection of the presently 
unresolved debate about the distinction of emotions within literature (Brader, Valentino, & 
Suhay, 2008; Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006 as cited in Petersen, 2010).  
Overall, negative emotion was found to be a potent antecedent of political intolerance. 
Thus, Kuklinski and his colleagues (1991) were not far from the mark in claiming that 
people‟s tolerance judgements are influenced more by emotion than rational thought. The 
notion of intergroup threat and negative emotion as potent triggers of political intolerance is 
further supported by the fact that they were stronger predictors of intolerance than outgroup 
appraisal and racial identification, as will be seen below. 
 
OUTGROUP APPRAISAL AND POLITICAL INTOLERANCE 
Outgroup appraisals literature contends that when outgroups are appraised as stronger 
than the ingroup, this propagates fear within ingroup members. On the other hand when 
outgroups are appraised as weaker than the ingroup, this results in anger (Frijda et al., 1989). 
In addition, it was proposed that both anger and fear may lead to action tendencies (avoidant 
and confrontational) that are part and parcel of political intolerance thus suggesting that both 
kinds of appraisals could indirectly lead to political intolerance. The results of this study did 
not support these predictions. Although the target outgroup was appraised as stronger than the 
ingroup by most participants, this did not result in more fear and less anger amongst them. 
Infact, there was almost no relationship between the outgroup appraisals that they made and 
the kind of emotions that they expressed. In addition, there was no significant relationship 
between outgroup appraisal and political intolerance.  
It is difficult to ascertain why this was the case. However, one possible explanation 
could be that perceived racial threat is so powerful that it neutralises the influence of 
outgroup appraisals on emotion making it insignificant. Thus, when outgroup appraisals are 
made within the context of high threat, individuals responses may be determined more by the 
threat than their appraisals of the outgroup. In support of this, Gibson and Gouws‟ (2003) 
study investigating political intolerance in South Africa found that when the perception of 
outgroup power was analysed as a separate variable from threat, it did not have an influence 
on political intolerance. However, when it was analysed as one of the threat variables, it was 
positively associated with political intolerance. Hence they concluded that “the power of a 
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group has little to do with the level of tolerance expressed towards it” (Gibson & Gouws, 
2003, p.69). Although plausible, this conclusion has not yet been verified by empirical 
research. This therefore highlights the need for further investigation into outgroup appraisals 
in relation to political intolerance.    
 
RACIAL (INGROUP) IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL INTOLERANCE 
Racial identification is another variable that was expected to influence negative 
intergroup emotion and political intolerance in this study. It was proposed that high 
identifiers would experience more racial threat and therefore more intense negative emotion 
and political intolerance; while low identifiers would experience less racial threat and 
therefore less intense negative emotion and political intolerance (Crisp et al., 2007). The 
results of this study offered mixed support for this hypothesis. To begin with, racial 
identification was not related to the amount of racial threat perceived by participants. It was 
also not a strong predictor of political intolerance. Nevertheless, it still managed to influence 
the quantity or intensity of negative emotion felt by individuals. Thus, it seemed to have an 
independent influence on negative emotion that was distinct to the influence of racial threat 
on negative emotion.  
A large amount of empirical research corroborates the finding that strength of ingroup 
identification influences the quantity of intergroup emotion experienced by individuals (Crisp 
et al., 2007). However, the fact that this same variable was not significantly related to 
political intolerance in this sample, contradicts the findings of several studies that 
demonstrate that ingroup identification is related to the negative attitudes and action 
tendencies adopted towards outgroups (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Jones et al., 2009). It is 
possible then that there was another variable that influenced the relationship between racial 
identification, negative emotion and political intolerance in this sample; one that inhibits high 
identifiers who experience intense negative emotion, from expressing high levels of political 
intolerance; a variable such as group norms (Jones et al., 2007). 
 Group norms can be defined as “the attitudes and behaviours that are typical of a 
given group, and which differentiate it from other groups” (Jones et al., 2007, p. 855). Social 
scientists have found that how highly individuals identify with their social groups has a 
bearing on the extent to which they stick to their group norms. High identifiers are more 
likely to adhere to group norms than low identifiers. In addition, when a particular social 
identity is salient, individuals are more likely to conform to their social group‟s norms (Jones 
et al., 2007). In the present study, ethnic/racial identity was made salient. Therefore, if 
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participants believed that tolerance was one of the norms of their racial group, it is possible 
that those with high identification may have adhered to this group norm, even when they 
experienced strong negative emotions towards the outgroup. This would explain why racial 
identification was associated with negative emotions but not political intolerance in this 
sample. Although plausible, this idea cannot be verified at present as the examination of 
group norms was beyond the scope of this study. It however, underscores the need for further 
research into this variable and its possible relationship with racial identification and political 
intolerance in this context. 
 
POLITICAL INTOLERANCE: NOT JUST AN ISSUE FOR “PARTICULAR” 
GROUPS 
Apart from asserting that intergroup threat and negative intergroup emotion are triggers of 
intolerance, the results of this study also demonstrate that political intolerance is not a 
phenomenon that is confined to “particular” groups of people. A large amount of empirical 
research purports that political intolerance is more prevalent amongst conservative, less 
educated groups of people, of low socio-economic status (Renfro et al., 2006; Sullivan et al., 
1990 as cited in Shamir 1991). In light of this, the sample used in this study was one which 
would normally be regarded as less prone to expressing political intolerance. However, the 
results of this study indicate otherwise.  
Perceived racial threat and negative emotions were still able to trigger political 
intolerance in this sample, thereby reiterating the fact that these two factors are powerful 
antecedents of political intolerance. This may explain why political intolerance is still very 
rampant in South African society today (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). As long as intergroup 
threat and negative emotions are salient in society, it is likely that intolerance will continue to 
be part and parcel of the relational dynamics between social groups. 
The use of a post-apartheid sample also elucidated the fact that race is still an 
influential factor in South African society today. Threat to participants‟ racial groups, greatly 
influenced the response that they had towards the outgroup. This therefore re-affirms the 
claim that it is not plausible to explore the issue of political intolerance in South Africa 
without exploring the issue of race and also re-emphasizes Gibson and Gouws‟ (2003, p.35) 
statement, that “one cannot write about South African politics without writing about race.” 
 
  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
81 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Although the discussion so far has emphasised the potency of intergroup threat and 
negative emotions, it‟s important to note that these factors may not always translate into 
political intolerance. It is imperative to explore factors that could prevent intergroup threat 
and negative emotions from leading to political intolerance in the South African context 
(protective factors). In other words, factors that promote tolerance in society. Some of the 
viable factors put forward by literature are group norms and political sophistication (Halperin 
et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2007). As mentioned earlier, group norms may prevent individuals 
who experience strong negative emotion from becoming politically intolerant. Thus it would 
be important to investigate whether they have an influence on intolerance in this context.  
Political sophistication can be defined as the amount of information that people have 
regarding political issues and events in their society. A study found that people‟s level of 
political sophistication influences their tolerance judgements. In the context of high negative 
emotion, individuals who are high in political sophistication are less likely to express 
intolerance than individuals who have low levels of political sophistication. Thus political 
knowledge may to a certain extent inhibit negative emotion from translating into intolerance 
(Halperin et al., 2009). It would be important to explore whether this is true of the South 
African context.  
Finally, the findings of this study indicate that it would also be useful to explore 
whether positive emotion can inhibit threat from translating into intolerance. Participants who 
were exposed to the humorous stimulus in this study, expressed significantly less threat and 
less intolerance.  
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
Although interesting, the current findings should be treated with some caution due to 
particular limitations of the study. Firstly, a specific sample (UCT students) was employed in 
the investigation of the research hypotheses. This sample may not be representative of the 
whole post-apartheid generation of South Africans. Thus it may be difficult to generalise the 
results of this study to all South Africans who are part of this generation. However, it is 
important to note that this sample was employed because it allowed us to investigate whether 
intergroup threat and negative emotions are as powerful as they have been proposed to be in 
the development of political intolerance. Therefore, it was deliberately selected for a 
particular purpose. Another limitation of this study is that, a considerable amount of data was 
excluded for various reasons, outlined in the results chapter. This could therefore have led to 
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bias within the findings. However, as has been seen, the results of this study are largely in 
line with previous empirical research, and this therefore reiterates their validity and 
reliability.               
CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the findings of this thesis support IET. Although not all the hypotheses 
generated from this theory were supported, the major variables postulated to influence action 
tendencies of ingroups towards outgroup  self-categorisation, intergroup threat, and 
negative emotion  exerted a significant influence on political intolerance. Therefore IET 
offers a plausible and comprehensive explanation of how intergroup threat can translate into 
political intolerance.     
This thesis also drew a number of additional conclusions: (a) that racial threat and 
negative emotions are potent predictors of political intolerance, (b) that these two variables 
may be more powerful than outgroup appraisal and racial identification in the development of 
political intolerance, (c) that political intolerance is not a phenomenon that is confined to less 
educated groups of people of low socio-economic status, and (d) that race at present still 
influences people‟s political tolerance judgements in South Africa. 
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APPENDIX A: Thoughts on Malema Questionnaires (TMQ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THOUGHTS ON MALEMA QUESTIONAIRE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: Melina Ojiambo 
Email: melina.ojiambo@uct.ac.za  
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INSTRUCTIONS: This is a study of the political attitudes of different individuals in South 
Africa. Please try to be as honest as possible when answering the questions, as this will help 
us to better understand students’ attitudes towards political issues. 
 Please fill in all the questions in the questionnaire to the best of your ability. Thank 
you for your help in advance      
 
 
SECTION A 
1. What ethnic group do you belong to? (for example, Black Xhosa, White-English,  
White Afrikaans, Indian, etc.)  ............................................................... 
     
 
 
 
The following provides some information about Julius Malema. Please read it carefully. 
 
 
 
JULIUS MALEMA  
Julius Malema was born on 3
rd
 March 1981 into a township in Seshego, Limpopo. He was 
brought up by his mother Flora and his grandmother Sarah.  
From a young age, Malema displayed his ability to lead. At the age of 14, he became 
the leader of the ANC Youth league (ANCYL) in his hometown. At 16 he was elected as 
chairman of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in Limpopo. He then became 
the national president of COSAS four years later.  
In 2008, Malema was elected as president of the ANC youth league at their national 
conference. He has been credited with playing a major role in the 2009 ANC election 
campaign which saw President Zuma come into power. Malema is very influential amongst 
the black youth of South Africa and it has been said that he, like Nelson Mandela may one 
day rise through the ranks of the ANC to become the president of South Africa. 
Malema currently aged 29 lives in Sandton, a suburb in Johannesburg and works from 
his office at Luthuli house, the headquarters of the ANC.     
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The following is the text of a blog posting on the news and discussion site, 
AfricaOpinion.com. The blog was posted by Ghanaian contributor Michael Appiah on 08-07-
2010. Please read the blog carefully and answer the questions that follow. 
Thursday, 8TH July 2010 
  
News from the South  
 
In my last postings I have been talking about my recent 3 month trip to South Africa. 
I am going to end with a final, rather strange political story that has important 
lessons.    
One evening when I was in Port Elizabeth, I switched on the TV and there on 
the news was the current ANC Youth League president Julius Malema. I watched in 
astonishment as Malema threw a BBC journalist out of a press conference. For 
those of you who didn’t see the video clip that did the rounds on YouTube: the 
journalist had asked him whether he [Julius Malema] lives in Sandton, a wealthy 
suburb in Johannesburg. In response, Malema said the following to the journalist: 
“Here you behave or else you jump, don’t come here with that tendency, don’t 
come here with that white tendency...if you’ve got a tendency of undermining blacks 
even where you work, you’re in the wrong place.”  
Malema then proceeded to insult, shout and swear at the journalist calling him 
a “bastard” and “bloody agent”.  
As I watched all this, I wondered to myself, how did South Africa get here? 
How could such a public figure and leader openly express such prejudiced views in a 
nation that is fighting to achieve reconciliation, tolerance and peace between 
different groups of people? Who is this Malema?  
As you know, I always dig for detail. I made some enquiries and here’s what I 
found out.  
Malema’s name was first launched into the public eye in June 2008 by his 
shocking public declaration “We are prepared to die for Zuma. Not only that, we are 
prepared to take up arms and kill for Zuma.” This said in a nation that has witnessed 
much bloodshed over the years due to political violence, one can only but take what 
Malema said seriously. Not too long after this declaration, Malema’s radical nature 
was witnessed yet again when he led students at the University of Johannesburg in 
the song “shoot the boere [farmers] they are rapists.” Even after the song was 
outlawed, Malema defiantly sang it in Zimbabwe, a day after the murder of the 
former AWB leader Eugene Terreblanche. 
Malema has made no move to hide his prejudiced views and has verbally 
attacked different individuals and groups over the past few years. He refers to the 
leader of the Democratic Alliance (official opposition party), Helen Zille, as “that 
racist girl” even though she is 30 years older than him. When challenged by the DA 
youth leaders to a public debate in 2009, Malema responded by saying “I only 
debate with serious political youth formations. Not a group of the racist Helen Zille’s 
garden boys.” He referred to the black individuals in the DA as “garden boys who 
smile at the madam.”    
In another instance, during Jacob Zuma’s rape trial, Malema attacked the 
Sonke gender, justice advocacy group for taking him to the equality court for making 
a sexist statement against Zuma’s accuser. He responded by saying: 
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 “The black faces you see in front (with reference to the Sonke group)- those 
are not real faces, they represent the whites who are opposed to African leadership. 
The imperialists and the whites who are still representing the past are using this 
organisation.”  
Thus implying that no black person can or should oppose Zuma.  
Malema has become well known in South Africa for his controversial 
statements. Another example is, If you arrest him [Zuma], he will lead us from prison. 
We are not afraid to be led by a president in orange clothes.”  
When Zuma was charged with corruption, Malema exclaimed, “but what is 
wrong with the president of the country being in and out of court?” 
Despite all the controversy surrounding Malema and his actions, the ANC 
leadership has rarely reprimanded him for his behaviour. In most cases, they have 
let him go with a mere slap on the wrist. Perhaps this is because he has managed to 
garner a large following for the ANC. In fact, Malema has to a large extent been 
credited with aiding Zuma in gaining his victory as president of the ANC. Malema 
and his colleagues like to remind the ANC leadership that they, the youth league 
delivered most of the votes to the ANC during the 2009 election, making sure that 
the ANC ended up with a 65.9% of the total vote.  
Now for the really worrying part. Despite all the controversy surrounding him, 
Malema has apparently continued to grow in influence and power over the years. 
Within the ANC and ANC youth league, it has been said that those who do not love 
Malema, fear him or tolerate him because he serves their purposes and most make 
sure that they stay on his right side.  
How does Malema sustain his power? There are plenty of allegations of 
“tenderpreneurship” as they call it in SA, with Malema amassing great wealth 
through his political power in his home province. Perhaps he uses his wealth to buy 
influence. Perhaps it’s a combination of charisma and bully tactics.  
But perhaps Malema is onto something, giving a voice to the millions of black 
South Africans who feel cheated and frustrated by the promise of multiracial 
democracy and economic improvement. The black economic empowerment 
programme has gone awry, creating a few bling millionaires but leaving the 
frustrated majority behind. In light of this, I can see how Malema’s populist rhetoric 
appeals to the masses.  And with numbers behind him, he could be unstoppable. If it 
is indeed true that the ANC youth league is the breeding ground for future leaders, 
then it is highly possible that Julius Malema may become part of the ANC leadership 
and perhaps even President of the country in future. 
If this is so, I think that South Africans need to ask themselves: Is this the 
future they want? Is this the kind of leadership that South Africa needs?  
 
 
POSTED BY MICHAEL  APP IAH AT 9:56 AM,  78  COMMENTS  
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SECTION B 
1. According to this blog author, which attributes describe Julius Malema? (Tick all the 
relevant ones) 
a. friendly 
b. open to questioning 
c. peaceful 
d. racist 
e. powerful 
f. democratic 
g. power-hungry 
h. wise 
i. irresponsible 
j. statesman-like 
k. discriminatory 
l. impulsive 
 
2. To what extent do you agree with the blog author‟s view of Julius Malema? (tick the 
appropriate block) 
 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
3. On a scale of 1-10, indicate your level of support for Julius Malema as a political 
leader. (circle a number from 1 to 10, where 1=No support, 10 =very strong support) 
 
       1           2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9          10 
no support                                                                                                                    very strong support 
 
 
SECTION C  
The following statements relate to Julius Malema and his key supporters within the ANC 
youth league. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement/question by 
circling/ ticking your preferred answer. 
 
1. As a leader, Julius Malema genuinely tries to address the needs and issues of all 
ethnic groups including mine.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
2. Julius Malema and his key supporters instigate conflict between the different ethnic 
groups in society. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
Neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
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3. I trust Julius Malema and his key supporters to acknowledge and respect equally the 
values, views and beliefs of all groups in society. 
strongly 
agree 
Agree slightly 
agree 
Neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
4. Julius Malema and his key supporters only want to empower certain groups in South 
Africa.  
strongly 
agree 
Agree slightly 
agree 
Neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
5. Julius Malema is racially prejudiced.  
strongly 
agree 
Agree slightly 
agree 
Neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
6. Julius Malema and his key supporters respect the property and ownership rights of all 
ethnic groups in South Africa.  
strongly 
agree 
Agree slightly 
agree 
Neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
       
7. Julius Malema and his key supporters pose a threat to my ethnic group in South 
Africa. 
strongly 
agree 
Agree Slightly 
Agree 
Neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
SECTION D 
As a member of your ethnic group, to what extent do you feel the following emotions when 
you think about Julius Malema, his key supporters and their behaviour? (Please indicate the 
intensity of your emotion by circling your level of each emotion felt on a scale of 1-7.)  
 
 
anxious 
1)            not at all anxious                                                                             extremely anxious             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
irritated 
2)           not at all irritated                                                                              extremely irritated             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
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hostile 
3)              not at all hostile                                                                             extremely hostile             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
happy 
4)                not at all happy                                                                            extremely happy             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
worried 
5)             not at all worried                                                                            extremely worried             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
furious 
6)             not at all furious                                                                             extremely furious 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
 disgusted 
7)         not at all disgusted                                                                             extremely disgusted             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
proud 
8)               not at all proud                                                                             extremely proud             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
uneasy 
9)             not at all uneasy                                                                             extremely uneasy             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
outraged 
10)        not at all outraged                                                                             extremely outraged            
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
hateful 
11)             not at all hateful                                                                              extremely hateful             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
calm 
12)                 not at all calm                                                                             extremely calm             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
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afraid 
13)               not at all afraid                                                                             extremely afraid             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
angry 
14)                not at all angry                                                                             extremely angry             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
joyful 
15)             not at all joyous                                                                              extremely joyous             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
 
If you are a supporter of Julius Malema and his faction within the ANCYL, skip the 
following section (Section E) and go straight to Section F.  
If you support a non-Malema faction within the ANCYL, or if you support a different 
(i.e. non-ANC) political organisation altogether, then please answer Section E first. 
 
SECTION E 
The following items ask you to compare the Malema-led faction within the ANC Youth 
League, with the political group / party that you support. For each question choose one 
group by making a tick in one block, either Malema’s group or your preferred group.  
 
 Malema‟s faction 
in the ANCYL 
My preferred 
political group / 
party 
1. Who has more influence over government decisions? 
  
2. Who has more support for their views from the SA 
public? 
  
3. Who has more access to financial resources? 
  
4. Who has more positive coverage in the media? 
  
5. Who has more power, overall, within the current SA 
political context? 
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SECTION F 
The following questions ask about your personal opinion regarding the political activities of 
Julius Malema and his supporters within the ANC Youth League. Please indicate your level 
of agreement with each statement/question by circling/ ticking your preferred answer. 
 
       
1. Julius Malema and his key supporters should be allowed door to door campaigns in 
my community.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
2. The government should have the right to “gag” Malema (i.e. stop him from making 
statements to the media and the public) if he continues expressing extreme views. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
3. Malema and his supporters should not be allowed to hold rallies in particular areas if 
there is a possibility that conflict could erupt. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
4. Politicians like Malema should be allowed to make speeches in my community, even 
if their speeches contradict the values of my community. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
       
5. The media should deliberately give moderate politicians more space to air their views, 
and give less space to politicians like Julius Malema. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
6. Julius Malema and his key supporters should not be allowed to publicly criticise my 
party and its leaders. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
7. Politicians like Malema should be allowed to hold political rallies in any communities 
they wish, including mine. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
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8. Malema and his key supporters should only be allowed to speak in places where they 
are welcome. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
9. Politicians like Julius Malema should be allowed to stand as candidates for the 
presidency of South Africa. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
10. I feel sympathetic towards members of my party who sometimes act aggressively 
towards the Malema faction within the ANC Youth League. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
       
11. Julius Malema should not be allowed to bring external supporters into my community 
for a political rally. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
12. If members of my party attacked supporters of Julius Malema, I would want those 
members of my party to be firmly disciplined. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
      
13. I believe in political tolerance for socially responsible parties, but politicians like 
Julius Malema do not deserve to be tolerated. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
14. Politicians like Julius Malema should not be allowed to be voted into high positions 
in government. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
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15. Malema and his supporters should be allowed to buy advertising space in the media to 
promote their views. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
SECTION G 
The following questions ask you how you feel about being a member of your ethnic group. 
Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement. 
  
1. I‟m very interested in what others think about my ethnic group.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
2. When I talk about my ethnic group, I usually say “we” rather than “they.” 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagre  
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
       
3. When I hear someone who is not from my ethnic group criticize my ethnic group, 
I feel personally criticized.   
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
4. Being a member of this ethnic group is an important part of who I am. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
      
5. When someone praises my ethnic group it feels like a personal compliment. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
       
6. I feel proud to be a member of my ethnic group. 
very 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
      
7. My views are in line with those of my ethnic group.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
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8. I act like other members of my ethnic group to a great extent.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
SECTION H: Demographics 
1. Gender:  
a. Male  
b. Female 
 
2. Age..........................  
3. Are you a South African citizen? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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THOUGHTS ON MALEMA QUESTIONAIRE 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: Melina Ojiambo 
Email: melina.ojiambo@uct.ac.za  
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INSTRUCTIONS: This is a study of the political attitudes of different individuals in South 
Africa. Please try to be as honest as possible when answering the questions, as this will help 
us to better understand students’ attitudes towards political issues. 
 Please fill in all the questions in the questionnaire to the best of your ability. Thank 
you for your help in advance      
 
 
 
SECTION A 
1. What ethnic group do you belong to? (for example, Black Xhosa, White English, 
White Afrikaans, Indian etc.) ............................................................... 
     
 
 
 
The following provides some information about Julius Malema. Please read it carefully. 
 
 
 
JULIUS MALEMA  
Julius Malema was born on 3
rd
 March 1981 into a township in Seshego, Limpopo. He was 
brought up by his mother Flora and his grandmother Sarah.  
Malema has been involved in politics from a young age. At the age of 14, he became 
the leader of the ANC Youth league (ANCYL) in his hometown. At 16 he was elected as 
chairman of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in Limpopo. He then became 
the national president of COSAS four years later.  
In 2008, Malema was elected as president of the ANC Youth League at their national 
conference. He has been credited with playing a major role in the 2009 ANC election 
campaign which saw Jacob Zuma come into power as ANC President. Malema wields 
significant political power in his home province of Limpopo, and also has the support of the 
(currently dominant) faction within the ANC Youth League. He is a controversial figure who 
has been reprimanded by the ANC leadership for ill discipline and contradicting the official 
party line. He has also run afoul of the media for making inflammatory statements, and for 
his personal accumulation of wealth. 
Julius Malema currently lives in Sandton, a suburb in Johannesburg, and works from 
his office at Luthuli house, the headquarters of the ANC.     
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Please read the Madam & Eve cartoon strip below and answer the questions that follow 
overleaf. 
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SECTION B 
1. The Madam & Eve cartoon you just read asks us to imagine Julius Malema as James 
Bond. Why do you think the cartoonists chose Bond?  
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................ 
 
2. In the opening frame, the TV newsreader says “...political analysts now believe ANC 
youth league leader Julius Malema might be a liability to the ANC...and an asset to 
C.O.P.E.” (C.O.P.E is a opposition party which started as a break-away from the 
ANC.) What does the cartoon mean by “liability to the ANC” and “asset to C.O.P.E” 
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
.................................................. 
 
 
3. On a scale of 1-7, how do you rate this particular cartoon on the following aspects. 
 
 
funny 
1)                not at all funny                                                                             extremely funny             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
insulting 
2)           not at all insulting                                                                             extremely insulting             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
fair 
3)                    not at all fair                                                                             extremely fair             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
 
clever 
4)                not at all clever                                                                             extremely clever             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
 
4. Any other comments? 
..........................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
.................... 
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4. To what extent do you agree with the cartoonists‟ view of Julius Malema? 
 
 strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
5. On a scale of 1-10, indicate your level of support for Julius Malema as a political leader. 
(circle a number from 1 to 10, where 1=no support, 10 =very strong support) 
 
       1           2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9          10 
no support                                                                                                         very strong support 
 
 
 
SECTION C  
The following statements relate to Julius Malema and his key supporters within the ANC 
youth league. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement/question by 
circling/ ticking your preferred answer. 
 
 
1. Having colourful characters like Malema on the scene, makes politics more 
interesting for the average person. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
2. As a leader, Julius Malema genuinely try to address the needs and issues of all ethnic 
groups including mine.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
3. Julius Malema and his key supporters instigate conflict between the different ethnic 
groups in society. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
4. It‟s hard to take “Juju” Malema seriously. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
5. I trust Julius Malema and his key supporters to acknowledge and respect equally the 
values, views and beliefs of all groups in society. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
107 
 
6. Julius Malema and his key supporters only want to empower certain groups in South 
Africa.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
7. Ultimately, Julius Malema will bring about his own downfall. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
8. Julius Malema is racially prejudiced.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
9. The media have the right to make jokes about Malema when he says foolish or 
outrageous things.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
10. Julius Malema and his key supporters respect the property and ownership rights of all 
ethnic groups in South Africa.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
       
11. Malema‟s public blunders are sometimes quite amusing. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
12. Julius Malema and his key supporters pose a threat to my ethnic group in South 
Africa. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
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SECTION D 
As a member of your ethnic group, to what extent do you feel the following emotions when 
you think about Julius Malema, his key supporters and their behaviour? (Please indicate the 
intensity of your emotion by circling your level of each emotion felt on a scale of 1-7.)  
 
anxious 
1.            not at all anxious                                                                            extremely anxious             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
irritated 
2.           not at all irritated                                                                              extremely irritated             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
hostile 
3.              not at all hostile                                                                             extremely hostile             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
happy 
4.                not at all happy                                                                            extremely happy             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
worried 
5.             not at all worried                                                                            extremely worried             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
furious 
6.             not at all furious                                                                             extremely furious 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
amused 
7.             not at all amused                                                                             extremely amused 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
 disgusted 
8.         not at all disgusted                                                                             extremely disgusted             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
proud 
9.               not at all proud                                                                             extremely proud             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
uneasy 
10.             not at all uneasy                                                                             extremely uneasy             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
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outraged  
11.        not at all outraged                                                                             extremely outraged            
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
hateful 
12.             not at all hateful                                                                             extremely hateful             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
calm 
13.                 not at all calm                                                                             extremely calm             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
afraid 
14.               not at all afraid                                                                             extremely afraid             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
angry 
15.                not at all angry                                                                             extremely angry             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
joyful 
16.             not at all joyous                                                                              extremely joyous             
1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
 
 
 
If you are a supporter of Julius Malema and his faction within the ANCYL, skip the 
following section (Section E) and go straight to Section F.  
 
If you support a non-Malema faction within the ANCYL, or if you support a different 
(i.e. non-ANC) political organisation altogether, then please answer Section E first. 
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SECTION E 
The following items ask you to compare the Malema-led faction within the ANC Youth 
League, with the political group / party that you support. For each question choose one 
group by making a tick in one block, either Malema’s group or your preferred group.  
 
 Malema‟s faction 
in the ANCYL 
My preferred 
political group / 
party 
1. Who has more influence over government decisions? 
  
2. Who has more support for their views from the SA 
public? 
  
3. Who has more access to financial resources? 
  
4. Who has more positive coverage in the media? 
  
5. Who has more power, overall, within the current SA 
political context? 
  
 
 
SECTION F 
The following questions ask about your personal opinion regarding the political activities of 
Julius Malema and his supporters within the ANC Youth League. Please indicate your level 
of agreement with each statement/question by circling/ ticking your preferred answer. 
       
1. Julius Malema and his key supporters should be allowed door to door campaigns in 
my community.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
2. The government should have the right to “gag” Malema (i.e. stop him from making 
statements to the media and the public) if he continues expressing extreme views. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
3. Malema and his supporters should not be allowed to hold rallies in particular areas if 
there is a possibility that conflict could erupt. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
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4. Politicians like Malema should be allowed to make speeches in my community, even 
if their speeches contradict the values of my community. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
       
5. The media should deliberately give moderate politicians more space to air their views, 
and give less space to politicians like Julius Malema. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
6. Julius Malema and his key supporters should not be allowed to publicly criticise my 
party and its leaders. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
7. Politicians like Malema should be allowed to hold political rallies in any communities 
they wish, including mine. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
8. Malema and his key supporters should only be allowed to speak in places where they 
are welcome. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
9. Politicians like Julius Malema should be allowed to stand as candidates for the 
presidency of South Africa. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
10. I feel sympathetic towards members of my party who sometimes act aggressively 
towards the Malema faction within the ANC Youth League. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
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11. Julius Malema should not be allowed to bring external supporters into my community 
for a political rally. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
12. If members of my party attacked supporters of Julius Malema, I would want those 
members of my party to be firmly disciplined. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
      
13. I believe in political tolerance for socially responsible parties, but politicians like 
Julius Malema do not deserve to be tolerated. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
 
14. Politicians like Julius Malema should not be allowed to be voted into high positions 
in government. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
       
15. Malema and his supporters should be allowed to buy advertising space in the media to 
promote their views. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
       
       
SECTION G 
The following questions ask you how you feel about being a member of your ethnic group. 
Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement. 
  
1. I‟m very interested in what others think about my ethnic group.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
2. When I talk about my ethnic group, I usually say “we” rather than “they.” 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
       
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
113 
 
3. When I hear someone who is not from my ethnic group criticize my ethnic group, 
I feel personally criticized.   
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
4. Being a member of this ethnic group is an important part of who I am. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
      
5. When someone praises my ethnic group it feels like a personal compliment. 
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
       
6. I feel proud to be a member of my ethnic group. 
very 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
      
7. My views are in line with those of my ethnic group.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
       
8. I act like other members of my ethnic group to a great extent.  
strongly 
agree 
agree slightly 
agree 
neutral slightly 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
 
 
SECTION H: Demographics 
4. Gender:  
a. Male  
b. Female 
 
5. Age..........................  
6. Are you a South African citizen? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Identification with a Psychological Group Scale (IDPG)  
(Mael & Tetrick, 1992 as cited in Greene, 2004, p.141) 
 
Items in the scale refer to the participants‟ preferred political party 
1. When someone criticizes this group, it feels like a personal insult. 
2. I don‟t act like the typical person of this group (reversed). 
3. I‟m very interested in what others think about this group. 
4. The limitations associated with this group apply to me also 
5. When I talk about this group, I usually say “we” rather than “they.” 
6. I have a number of qualities typical of members of this group 
7. If a story in the media criticized this group, I would feel embarrassed. 
8. When someone praises this group, it feels like a personal compliment. 
9. I act like a person of this group to a great extent.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Informed Consent Form 
A survey of University Students’ political attitudes 
The purpose of this study is to examine the political attitudes of University students. 
Participation in this study will help us learn more about the political attitudes of South 
Africans in general.  
A questionnaire will be given to you to complete. This should take approximately 10-
15 minutes in total. You will then be free to leave at your own leisure. The questionnaire will 
be anonymous meaning that your identity will be kept confidential.  
It is important to note that participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate 
will not involve any penalties. You are free to stop participating in the research at any time 
without incurring any penalties or punishments. Before you agree to either participate or not 
participate in this study, I will answer any questions that you may have. 
 
For further questions or comments regarding this study please feel free to contact me  
Email: menamfuts@yahoo.com 
Phone number: 076 934 8913  
 
STUDENT NUMBER:                                                        
SIGNATURE:  
 
Thank you for your participation 
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“Thoughts on Malema” Debriefing Form  
 
The study that you took part in aims to understand some of the factors that could lead to 
political intolerance in society. Political intolerance occurs when certain groups or individuals 
in society are denied their basic political rights, for example the right to assemble and the 
right to speak publicly. They are therefore refused the right to express their views in society. 
Political intolerance is quite common in the South African context. In the 2009 general 
election for example, political intolerance occurred between different political parties to such 
a great extent that some areas were declared “no go zones.” Thus some parties were refused 
the right to campaign in particular areas. Political intolerance also led to violence between 
different political parties and rival parties disrupted each other‟s political rallies. These are 
examples of extreme, blatant and confrontational forms of political intolerance, however, 
there are also more subtle, less confrontational forms of political intolerance. Some examples 
of these are not allowing particular books to be kept in libraries because of the views that 
they put forward, or denying qualified individuals work opportunities because of their 
political affiliation.  
Political intolerance prevents groups in society from living together in harmony and in 
many cases may even lead to the breakdown of peace and stability. There is therefore a need 
to promote tolerance within the South African society for the sake of peace, stability and 
harmony between different groups. Therefore, it is important to investigate what factors or 
mechanisms may lead to the breakdown of tolerance and the development of intolerance. It is 
for this reason that this study examines the influence that perceived intergroup threat and 
negative emotions may have on the development of political intolerance in the South African 
context. 
Intergroup threat arises when one group in society challenges or endangers another 
group‟s goals or well being. Previous research has found that intergroup threat is linked to the 
development of political intolerance. Therefore, when one group feels threatened by another 
group, they are more likely to be intolerant of the group that threatens them (Gibson & 
Gouws, 2003). Researchers have also found that when one group threatens another, this is 
linked to negative emotions (like anger and fear) arising in the threatened group. Negative 
emotions have also been found to be related to the development of political intolerance. 
Research done around the influence of intergroup threat and negative emotions on political 
intolerance has mostly been done in contexts outside the South African context. It is therefore 
important to see whether intergroup threat and negative emotions are also related to political 
intolerance within this context and in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans. The 
intergroup emotions theory was used to explore this topic (see references below, for more 
information). 
As a participant in this study, you were assigned to one of two groups. One group read 
a blog about Julius Malema, while the other group read a cartoon strip about him. The blog 
was meant to cause participants in the blog group to feel some threat from Malema (increased 
threat group). While the cartoon was meant to reduce any threat that participants may feel 
from him (reduced threat group). With this information in mind, this study proposed a 
number of things. That:  
1. The participants in the increased threat group will experience more intergroup threat 
and thus express more intense negative emotions and more political intolerance, than 
the participants in the reduced threat group.  
2. The kind of emotion expressed will be influenced by whether the participants believe 
that Malema and his key supporters have more or less support than their own group. 
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3. How strongly individuals identify with their ethnic group will influence the intensity 
of emotion that they experience as well as the level of political intolerance that they 
express.   
The questionnaire you completed measured different things  how strongly you identify with 
your ethnic/ racial group, how threatened you feel by the Malema and his key supporters, 
your emotional response to threat and your level of tolerance/intolerance towards Malema 
and his key supporters.  
The results of this study indicated that the threat group participants expressed more intense 
negative emotion and political intolerance than the reduced threat group participants. 
Although most participants viewed Malema and his supporters as stronger than their 
preferred political group, this did not influence their emotional response towards him and his 
supporters. In addition, how strongly people identified with their ethnic group did not seem to 
influence the relationship between intergroup threat, negative emotion and political 
intolerance. Thus it was concluded that intergroup threat and negative emotion (anger, and 
fear) are potent triggers of political intolerance. In a nut shell, the more threatened people 
feel, the more negative emotion they express, and the more intolerant they become of the 
source of threat.   
 
Thank you very much for your input, please do not hesitate to ask any questions you may 
have. 
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Yours sincerely, 
Melina Ojiambo (Melina.Ojiambo@uct.ac.za)  
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APPENDIX D- SCALE REFINEMENT ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 
Table D1 
Perceived Racial Threat Scale Communalities  
Item From 1 factor Multiple R- Square 
C1 .35 .39 
C2 .48 .41 
C3 .40 .41 
C4 .44 .39 
C5 .49 .39 
C6 .21 .19 
C7 .26 .23 
 
 
 
Table D2 
Intergroup Emotion Scale Communalities from Three factors  
Item From 1 factor From 2 factors From 3 factors Multiple R-
square 
Anxious .05 .53 .54 .55 
Irritated .27 .33 .35 .44 
Hostile .38 .44 .44 .48 
Happy  .08 .08 .08 .30 
Worried .04 .73 .73 .61 
Furious .68 .75 .75 .73 
Disgusted .37 .39 .39 .45 
Proud .02 .03 .03 .19 
Uneasy .14 .39 .39 .47 
Outraged .57 .62 .66 .64 
Hateful .61 .65 .69 .69 
Afraid .02 .37 .37 .39 
Angry .53 .57 .64 .62 
Joyful .00 .01 .46 .20 
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Table D3 
Intergroup Emotion Scale Communalities from Two factors 
Item From 1 factor From 2 factors Multiple R- 
square 
Anxious .04 .54 .55 
Irritated .28 .34 .44 
Hostile .34 .41 .48 
Happy  .16 .17 .30 
Worried .04 .73 .61 
Furious .69 .78 .73 
Disgusted .38 .41 .45 
Proud .07 .08 .18 
Uneasy .17 .45 .47 
Outraged .59 .65 .64 
Hateful .64 .69 .69 
Afraid .02 .36 .39 
Angry .61 .65 .62 
Joyful .06 .08 .20 
 
 
Table D4 
Political Intolerance Scale Communalities 
Item From 1 
factor 
Multiple 
R-square 
F1 .38 .38 
F2 .39 .44 
F3 .41 .45 
F4 .52 .61 
F5 .19 .27 
F6 .41 .44 
F7 .47 .57 
F8 .46 .53 
F9 .34 .38 
F10 .00 .07 
F11 .35 .42 
F12 .00 .08 
F13 .29 .48 
F14 .37 .51 
F15 .14 .20 
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Table D5 
Racial Identification Scale Communalities 
Item From 1 
factor 
Multiple 
R- 
square 
G1 .07 .12 
G2 .15 .19 
G3 .41 .42 
G4 .62 .59 
G5 .62 .59 
G6 .31 .39 
G7 .53 .51 
G8 .40 .45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
